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MANIFEST INTENT AND COPYRIGHTABILITY:
THE DESTINY OF JOINT AUTHORSHIP'
I. Introduction
'I weep for you,' the Walrus said:
'I deeply sympathize.'
With sobs and tears he sorted out
Those of the largest size,
Holding his pocket-handkerchief
Before his streaming eyes.
'0 Oysters,' said the Carpenter,
'You've had a pleasant run!
Shall we be trotting home again?'
But answer came there none-
And this was scarcely odd, because
They'd eaten every one.2
In Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass, it was "scarcely
odd" to act contrary to one's subjective intent; after all, even the
physical laws were perverse in Alice's dream world. In copyright law,
the use of a subjective intent standard in joint authorship is a "curi-
ouser" (to quote Mr. Carroll) phenomenon. Joint authors own rights
in property, 3 not oyster dinners; predicating these property rights on
state of mind,4 when actions manifest the opposite, deprives authors
of constitutional rights.5
The 1976 Copyright Act (the 1976 Act)6 defines joint work as "a
work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
1. A previous version of this Note won second prize in the 1989 Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition at Fordham University School of Law.
2. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (illustrations by Sir John Tenniel)
(Macmillan 1872, rev. ed. 1963).
3. See infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text, explaining that joint authors own
property rights in the whole work, not merely their contributions to it, because they are
tenants-in-common. H.R. RFP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5735 [hereinafter H.R. REP.].
4. Under the 1976 Act, copyright protection extends to an author of an original
work fixed in a tangible medium and embodying an expression rather than an idea. See
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914, 102(a), (b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Subjective intent is not a
component of the copyrightability doctrine as expounded in § 102.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "Congress shall have the power ... to promote the
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." Id.
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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unitary whole." 7 Due to the ambiguity in the terms "intention" and
"authors," courts and treatises have misinterpreted the statutory defi-
nition. Through the subsequent misapplication of the joint author-
ship doctrine, these ambiguities deny property rights to coauthors.
The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act regards intention as
the definition's "touchstone"a-its single most important element.
The Second Circuit9 recently held that this intent element includes a
subjective standard. 10 However, both the legislative history of the
1976 Act11 and common design, 2 the precursor of intent, confirm the
objective standard and reject the subjective intent standard in joint
authorship.
The joint work definition also requires the participation of "two or
more authors."13 Whether a prospective joint "author" must provide
copyrightable expressions or merely ideas has not been resolved. Ad-
ditionally, even if the contribution must rise to the level of an expres-
sion, the composition of a copyrightable expression in joint
authorship remains an unsettled issue.
This Note clarifies the definition of joint authorship. Part II ex-
plores the history of the intent element prior to the 1976 Act. Part III
traces the discussions and reports submitted to Congress during for-
mation of the 1976 Act definition of joint works. Part IV compares
current case law that erroneously applies a subjective standard with
case law that correctly extends the objective intent standard of com-
mon design. Part V interprets the 1976 Act as requiring copyright-
ability of all contributions to a joint work. Part V also supports a
literal interpretation of the elements of authorship, intent and merger
in the statutory definition of joint work. This Note concludes by ad-
vocating a continued use of the standard of common design, but
under the new term "manifest intent."
II. Intent: Pre-1976 Act History
The copyright provision of the Constitution "promot[es] the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts."' 4 Authors receive rights in their
7. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of joint work) (emphasis added).
8. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120.
9. Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989).
10. See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 49-83 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 24-36, 45-48 and accompanying text.
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of joint work) (emphasis added).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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works to foster these constitutional goals and benefit society. 5 The
1909 Copyright Act did not directly define the rights of coauthors 6
and, as a result, joint authorship rights were created through the
courts.17 Through an analogy between tangible and intangible prop-
erty, 8 coauthors receive rights in their work as tenants-in-common. 19
Each coauthor owns a one-half undivided interest in the whole and
can license the whole without the consent of the other.2° Without
these rights in the whole, less incentive would exist to coauthor a
work because parts of a joint work are not often exploitable sepa-
rately. With less incentive, fewer joint works would be created (espe-
cially the more complex and substantial works requiring diverse
talents), 21 and society would be deprived of this resource. In Edward
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. ,22 Judge Learned
Hand reiterated the rationale underlying the unique rights of joint
authors: "to allow the author to prevent the composer, or the com-
poser to prevent the author, from exploiting [the work as a whole] ...
would be to allow him to deprive his fellow contributor of the most
valuable part of his contribution; to take away the kernel and leave
15. See supra note 5.
16. See 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.01, at 6-2 n.1
(rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter I NIMMER] (indicating the Copyright Act of 1909 did not
define joint authorship).
17. See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd
on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972); Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. (the "12th Street Rag" case), 221 F.2d 569 (2d
Cir. 1955); "Melancholy Baby," 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946); Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944); Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195
(S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
18. See Maurel, 271 F. at 214 ("there is no distinction.., between literary property
and property of any other description").
19. 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.09, at 6-21.
20. See H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 121.
There is... no need for a specific statutory provision concerning the rights and
duties of the coowners of a work; court-made law on this point is left undis-
turbed. Under the bill, as under the present law, coowners of a copyright would
be treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner having an in-
dependent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of account-
ing to the other coowners for any profits.
Id.; see also A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW 96 (5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted)
(indicating that an accounting of profits from the grant of a license to a third party is due
a coauthor).
21. For example, complex works such as the detailed research reports in Weissman,
substantial projects requiring diverse talents such as the sculpture and the special effects
in CCNV. Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), afl'd in part, rev'd
in part, 868 F.2d 1313, 1318-20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989); Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S.
Ct. 2166 (1989).
22. 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944).
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him only the husk."23
A. Common Design: The Objective Standard
"Common design" is the precursor of the objective intent standard
of the 1976 Act's joint work definition. In Maurel v. Smith, 24 Judge
Learned Hand adopted the first American definition of joint author-
ship25 from the English decision Levy v. Rutley :26 "to constitute joint
authorship there must be a common design."' 27 The creation of a sin-
gle work through cooperative effort constituted common design.28 In
Maurel, Judge Hand expanded Levy to include authors who did not
know each other at the time each part of the whole was created.29
Construing another early English authority, Hatton v. Keen, Judge
Hand indicated:3
the [Hatton] case did not turn upon any license given by the plain-
tiff, but upon whether his music had not gone into the fabric of the
presentation in such sense that he lost independent ownership ....
[O]ne who contributes to such a joint production does not retain
any several ownership in his contribution, but that it merges into
the whole.3"
Affirming Maurel,3 2 the Second Circuit emphasized that the joint ef-
fort of the parties indicated their intent to be coauthors.33
23. Id.
24. 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
25. See Maurel, 220 F. at 199 (Hand, J.): "[tihe only case in the books in which the
matter [of joint authorship] seems to have been discussed is Levy v. Rutly (sic)"; see also
Edward B. Marks Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. 2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944).
26. L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871) (holding that a subsequent edited version of the original
work was not a joint work because joint authorship arises "only when several parties
contributed their labor to the production by common and preconcerted design"), cited in
Maurel, 220 F. at 199.
27. Levy, L.R. 6 C.P. at 529.
28. Maurel, 220 F. at 199. The scenario for a comic opera was written first with the
libretto and lyrics added afterwards. Common design was determined from multiple con-
tributions to a single work intended for operatic performance. The ultimate purpose of
the contribution, its scheme in the common design of the unitary whole, determined its
status as part of a joint work rather than as an independent work. See generally SUB-
COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JU-
DICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, STUDY No. 12 (Comm.
Print 1960) (authored by G. Cary) [hereinafter STUDY No. 12].
29. Maurel, 220 F. at 199.
30. Id. at 201 (construing Hatton v. Keen, 7 C.B.N.S. 268, reprinted in 141 Eng. Rep.
819 (1859)) (in Hatton, plaintiff endeavored to collect for infringement of songs used in a
Shakespearean production). Judge Hand apparently derived his language in Marks from
Maurel. Marks, 140 F.2d at 267 ("the seamless fabric of the work").
31. Maurel, 220 F. at 201.
32. 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
33. Maurel, 271 F. at 214-15.
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In Edward B. Marks Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 34 Judge Hand
replicated his common design theory from Maurel." He determined
that the merger of the author's contribution with those of others into
a single work evidenced the intent of the authors to create a joint
work. He also expanded common design by requiring that parties
stipulate in advance the intent not to create a joint work. Thus, Judge
Hand interpreted the tandem creation of a work as manifesting the
intent to jointly own it: "when both plan an undivided whole ...
unless they stipulate otherwise in advance, their separate interests will
be as inextricably involved, as are the threads out of which they have
woven the seamless fabric of the work." 36
These early decisions established the common design doctrine and
laid the foundation for joint authorship. In common design, a contri-
bution is integrated into a single work having no previous existence.
This integration operates as an objective standard, not conditioned on
the contributing parties' state of mind..
B. "Melancholy Baby": The Subjective Standard
In 1911, a husband and wife song-writing team composed "Melan-
choly, 37 and registered the song under the Copyright Act of 1909.38
A year later, the husband consented to have new lyrics added to his
music in a song entitled "Melancholy Baby." In "Melancholy Baby,"
The managers and parties recognized this property right flowing from the col-
laboration of labor . . . .The result is that there was a joint co-operation in
carrying out the effort to complete the opera. It is not essential that the execu-
tion of the work should be equally divided; as long as the general design and
structure was agreed upon, the parties may divide their parts and work sepa-
rately. 'The pith of joint authorship consists in co-operation, in common design,
and whether this common design takes place subsequent to the formation of the
design by the one and is varied in conformity with the suggestions and views of
the other, it has equally the effect of creating the joint authorship as if the origi-
nal design had been their joint conception.'
Id. at 214-15 (emphasis added) (citing W. COPINGER, LAW OF COPYRIGHTS 109-10 (4th
ed. 1902)).
34. 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944).
35. Id. at 267. "[I]t makes no difference whether the authors work in concert or even
whether they know each other; it is enough that they mean their contributions to be
complementary in the sense that they are to be embodied in a single work to be performed
as such." Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. ("Melancholy Baby"), 161
F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
38. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-216, 11 (1909) (repealed by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982 and
Supp. IV 1986)). "Melancholy" was originally registered in Ernie Burnett's name only.
See "Melancholy Baby" 161 F.2d at 407. Although the couple divorced, they jointly
renewed their copyright registration in the song. See id. at 408-09.
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the case which determined the authorship rights of the first lyricist,
the composer and the second lyricist, a subjective standard replaced
the objective standard of common design.39 "Melancholy Baby" re-
lied on Marks as its primary support, using Judge Hand's rationale
that a lyricist and composer who did not collaborate could still coau-
thor the work." The "Melancholy Baby" court distorted the reason-
ing of Marks, however, by considering only the composer's subjective
intent to create a song and ignoring the vesting of joint authorship in
the first lyricist.4 By granting the second lyricist rights in the whole,
the court wrongfully diluted the rights of the initial lyricist.42 A state
of mind standard, disregarding the ownership rights of the first lyri-
cist, replaced the standard of common design. Despite the appellate
court's holding in this case, "Melancholy" was the joint work; "Mel-
ancholy Baby"-merely derivative. 3
Through reliance on "Melancholy Baby" and the subjective intent
standard, the misappropriation of coauthors' property rights contin-
ues. Although "Melancholy Baby" was clearly rejected by the 1976
Act's Panel of Consultants (the Panel),' the case is still cited to ex-
plain common design. Yet, in common design, the contributions of
the parties, not their state of mind, manifest their ultimate intent.
C. Continuing Validity of Common Design
The studies and panel discussions instrumental in formulating the
39. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. ("Melancholy
Baby"), 42 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), aff'd, 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944); Maurel v.
Smith, 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921). See supra notes 24-
36 and accompanying text for an explanation of the objective standard.
40. "Melancholy Baby," 161 F.2d at 409-10.
41. The "Melancholy Baby" court hypothesized that if the first lyricist had died or
changed her mind before the merger of the music with the lyrics, the composer could
have had someone else write the words. Id. at 410. Ignoring the vesting of rights in the
first lyricist, the court concluded "it should make no difference that Burnett's original
design to have his music combined with his wife's words was in fact realized. If the
words and music of a song constitute a unitary work as the Marks case held, then [the
second version] was a 'new work' separately copyrightable from the 1911 version." Id.
This conclusion is clearly incorrect. For critical comments on "Melancholy Baby" see
infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
42. But see 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07 at 6-18 to 19.
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), defining derivative work as based on "pre-existing
works"; see also infra note 56 and accompanying text, defining derivative work.
44. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. But see SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS,
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
2D SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY No. 31, at 175 (Comm. Print 1960) (au-
thored by B. Ringer) [hereinafter STUDY No. 31] (stating that although the reasoning of
"Melancholy Baby" was erroneous, the result could be justified if the new version was
first publication of the work).
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definition of joint authorship in the 1976 Act are replete with refer-
ences to prior case law, due partly to the dearth of statutory authority
prior to the 1976 Act and partly to the strongly persuasive nature of
this case law.45 Maurel, Marks, and "Melancholy Baby" are crucial
to an understanding of the intent element in the 1976 Act and current
copyright doctrine. 4 Although the term "common design" does not
appear in the 1976 Act or the House Report accompanying it, the
objective standard of common design as expounded by Maurel and
Marks can be read into these documents, since the intent on which
the statute focuses follows "traditional notions"4 7 as established by
prior case law. Additionally, the Panel's studies incidental to the
1976 Act unequivocally renounce the "Melancholy Baby" subjective
intent rationale.48
III. Legislative History of Joint Authorship in the
1976 Copyright Act: Formation of the "Touchstone of Intent"
Under the 1976 Act, intent is the fulcrum of joint authorship;49
45. See STUDY No. 12, supra note 28, and STUDY No. 31, supra note 44.
46. See Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting 1
NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03 at 6-6 ("[tjhe essence of a joint work is 'a joint laboring in
furtherance of a preconcerted common design' ")), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d
1313, 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989) (construing Marks and "Melan-
choly Baby" in regard to intent); Boggs v. Japp, [1989 Transfer Binder 2] Copyright L.
Rep. (CCH) 26,347, at 22,219 (E.D. Va. July 20, 1988) (citing 1 NIMMER, supra note
16, § 6.07, at 6-18 (rev. ed. 1987)); Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 1988 Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) 26,244, at 21,717, 21,722 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988) (citing 1 NIMMER, supra
note 16, § 6.06[A], at 6-14); Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D.
111. 1986) (citing the common design cases of Marks and "Melancholy Baby" as interpret-
ing intent); Rodak v. Esprit Racing Team, [1986 Transfer Binder] Copyright L. Rep.
(CCH) 25,883, at 20,024 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 1985) (citing Marks in regard to intent to
form a whole); S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at
6-6 (construing Levy, Maurel, Marks, "[w]ithout such a preconcerted common design the
resulting combination should not be regarded as a joint work"). Nimmer equates inten-
tion with common design. Id. at § 6.03, at 6-7: "[tlhe preconcerted common design, or,
in the words of the 1976 Act, 'the intention that their contributions be merged.'" But see
W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 115 (6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter W. PATRY]
("[tihe Act's definition thus strongly emphasizes the authors' intent at the time the work
is created, and in so doing represents a marked departure from opinions of the Second
Circuit under the 1909 Act which had held that where the complementary efforts were
performed at different times by authors unacquainted with one another, their product
was a joint work because they had a common design").
47. See A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBERG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES
228 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter LATMAN] (commenting on the definition of joint works in
the 1976 Act: "[a] touchstone of collaborative intent follows traditional notions"; 1 NIM-
MER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-7 ("[tjhe preconcerted design or in the words of the 1976
Act, 'the intention that their contributions be merged' ").
48. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining joint work); H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120
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joint work is defined as "a work prepared by two or more authors
with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable
or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."5 "Intention at the time
the writing is done"51 is the "touchstone"52 of joint authorship. The
Panel used the term "intent" to distinguish joint works53 from collec-
tive works,54 compilations," and derivative works.56 This distinction
was crucial because, in a single work, a joint author's rights in the
whole as a tenant-in-common are far more valuable than the rights of
("[tihe touchstone [of joint authorship] is the intention... that the parts be absorbed or
combined into an integrated unit").
50. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of joint work). See 1 NIMMER, supra note 16,
§ 6.04, at 6-11. Nimmer defines "inseparable" as when one author "recast[s], trans-
form[s] or adapt[s]" the contribution of the other author as in the House Report exam-
ples of a novel or painting. Id. Nimmer defines "interdependent" as when both authors'
contributions are "assembl[ed] into a collective whole." Id. House Report examples of
interdependent works include a motion picture, opera and the lyrics and music of a song.
H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120.
51. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120 (emphasis added).
52. Id.
Under the definition of § 101, a work is 'joint' if the authors collaborated with
each other, or if each prepared his or her contribution with the knowledge and
intention that it would be merged with the contributions of other authors as
'inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.' The touchstone here is
the intention at the time the writing is done that the parts be absorbed or com-
bined into an integrated unit.
Id. (emphasis added).
53. See STUDY No. 31, supra note 44, at 176 (discussing the differences between joint
works, composite works, collective works and derivative works (new versions); STUDY
No. 12, supra note 28, at 87-88 (discussing the differences between joint and composite
works).
54. In collective works, the elements remain "unintegrated and disparate." H.R.
REP., supra note 3, at 122. "A collective work is a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982) (emphasis added).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). A compilation is a "work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated or arranged
in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of author-
ship." Id.
A 'composite work,' broadly speaking, is one which puts together the separate
and distinct works of different authors. A clear-cut example would be a maga-
zine containing a number of short stories contributed by various independent
authors .... The magazine as a whole would be a 'composite work,' but neither
the magazine nor any of the stories by one author would be a 'joint work.' The
rights in each story would be owned by its author alone ... the rights in the
magazine as a whole ... [would be] owned by the magazine publisher alone.
STUDY No. 12, supra note 28, at 87.
56. Derivative work is a work based upon one or more preexisting works. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (emphasis added). A derivative author has rights only in his own
contribution. 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.05, at 6-12.
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a derivative author or an author of part of a collective work,57 or even
a sole author. In a derivative, collective or sole work, an author's
rights vest only in his own contribution.58
The legislative history of the 1976 Act demonstrates that the Panel
rejected a subjective intent standard in joint authorship.59 As of July
1961, in the Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Re-
vision of the United States Copyright Law (1961 Report),' the defini-
tion of joint work recommended by the Panel of Consultants did not
include the term "intention," but another analogous term-"ob-
ject" 6 -indicating "the purpose, aim or goal of a specific action or
effort."
62
While recognizing the validity of earlier case law espousing com-
mon design, 63 the 1961 Report unequivocally renounced the subjec-
tive standard of "Melancholy Baby "' and "12th Street Rag, ' 65 where
a work "complete in itself [becomes] a joint work ... at the request of
the copyright owner [i.e., by his subjective intent]."' 66 However, de-
spite the obvious legislative purpose behind the renunciation of these
cases and the subjective standard, courts and treatises continue to cite
"Melancholy Baby" to define joint authorship.67
57. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.05, at 6-12. Each joint author owns an undi-
vided interest in the work as a whole.
58. See id.
59. See infra notes 63-82 and accompanying text.
60. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (Comm. Print 1961) [here-
inafter 1961 REPORT].
61. 3 A. LATMAN & J. LIGHTSTONE, THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE PROJECT,
COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976 at 335 (1983) [hereinafter KAMINSTEIN]; 1961 REPORT, supra
note 60, at 90 ("a 'work of joint authorship' should be defined in the statute as a work
created initially by two or more authors with the object of integrating their contributions
into a single work").
62. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 904
(1981).
63. 1961 REPORT, supra note 60, at 90.
We believe the question of what constitutes a work of joint authorship should be
clarified in the statute. We would not go as far as the theory of the Twelfth
Street Rag decision [as first set forth in "Melancholy Baby"], but would adopt
the test laid down by the earlier line of cases-that a joint work is one created
by two or more authors who intend to have their contributions joined together
as a single work.
Id. The common design theory of joint authorship, as evidenced in this direct quote from
the Report of the Register, is embodied in the statutory definition. The manifest intent of
common design, not subjective intent, is the "intent" in the definition of joint works.
64. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. ("12th Street Rag"), 161 F.2d
406 (2d Cir. 1946).
65. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modi-
fied on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
66. 1961 REPORT, supra note 60, at 90.
67. See infra note 129.
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In the Preliminary Draft of 1963, the definition of joint work
changed to "with the intention that their contributions be merged into
indistinguishable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."'68 The
language of the early reports and the Preliminary Draft originated in
two studies submitted by members of the Panel of Consultants from
the Copyright Office.69 One of these studies illustrated the meaning of
"intent"7 through the example in Maurel v. Smith."1 In Maurel, the
word "intent" reflected purpose or aim demonstrated by action ("in-
tend by their combined efforts"),7" not by state of mind.
The Panel was particularly concerned that the meaning of "inten-
tion" might be misconstrued to include state of mind.73 From the
68. KAMINSTEIN, supra note 61, at 344 n.10; PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, pt. 3 (1964) [hereinafter PRELIMI-
NARY DRAFT].
69. STUDY No. 12, supra note 28, (G. Cary); STUDY No. 31, supra note 44, (B.
Ringer). Kaminstein, the Panel Chairman, was also from the Copyright Office. The
Panel of Consultants was comprised of a distinguished cross-section of representatives
including, but not limited to, the areas of law, broadcasting, records, publishing and mo-
tion pictures. For a list of Panel members, see PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 68.
70. STUDY No. 12, supra note 28, at 90 ("[t]he ingredients of joint authorship enu-
merated in this case are collaboration and common purpose. Joint authorship occurs
when two or more authors intend by their combined efforts to create a unitary work"
(emphasis added)). The case referred to is Levy v. Rutley, L.R. 6 C.P. 523 (1871), the
English authority cited by Judge Hand in Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944).
71. STUDY No. 12, supra note 28, at 90-91 (construing Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195
(S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921)).
Joint authorship occurs when two or more authors intend by their combined
efforts to create a unitary work.... A wrote a scenario for a comic opera, B the
libretto, and C the lyrics. Although A's scenario was written first, the court
held A to be joint author with B and C with all the rights and obligations which
arise from such an undertaking .... One who contributes to such a joint pro-
duction does not retain any separate ownership in his contribution, but it
merges into the whole.
Id.
72. Id.
73. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 68, at 265. American Bar Association Com-
mittee 302 Chairman Harry R. Olsson, Jr. commented:
I think a 'joint work' should be defined as a work which appears to be a unitary
whole, and whether a work is a 'joint work' or not should have nothing to do
with the intentions or mental state of the authors who worked on it. If Gilbert
did not intend 'The Pirates of Penzance' to be a 'joint work,' I think it should be
one nevertheless. Where the defendant in a lawsuit took a license from one of
two co-authors of an apparent joint work, the burden of proving what the inten-
tions of the plaintiffs were when they created the work is a very heavy burden to
put on him. Appearance, I think it clear, should govern this question.
Id.
Also addressing the uncertainty caused by a state of mind standard, Harold Orenstein,
in a letter written in comment on the Preliminary Draft, presaged the problem of fore-
casting a joint work before its actual creation. Id. at 410.
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initial drafting stages, the Panel created a middle ground straddling
both close collaboration and the more removed situation where au-
thors, not in direct collaboration, still "intended" their contributions
to be merged.74 Intent expanded joint authorship beyond strict col-
laboration-the term "collaboration" is conspicuously absent from
The question of whether a work is joint or composite is generally one which
only arises after the fact. ... Generally when writers start to work together they
have no idea whether what they are writing together will ultimately be pub-
lished or produced or whether one or the other will drop out of the collabora-
tion in the middle of it.
Id.
Reacting to concerns about subjective intent, Barbara Ringer defended the use of the
term "intention" in the joint work definition: "there really was no intention to change
[the definition's] basic substantive meaning [and the changes made] it more precise."
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, pt. 5, 1964 REVISION BILL WITH DISCUSSIONS AND COM-
MENTS, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter 1964 REVISION BILL).
The major change appears to have been the word "intention" as a substitution for the
term "object," creating an inference that subjective intent might be an element of the
revised definition. Ringer indicated the drafters' purpose was not to change the "substan-
tive meaning" of the definition, but to assuage fears that subjective intent might be con-
sidered an element of that definition. According to her, the changes protected the
substantial tenancy-in-common property rights vesting through joint authorship of a
work. Creating such rights "simply from the accident of bringing together two authors'
works" would have negated the protective purpose of the Panel's efforts. 1964 REVISION
BILL, supra, at 144.
You are dealing here with ownership; and to create a tenancy-in-common situa-
tion with all of the consequences that flow from that, simply from the accident
of bringing together two authors' works and without regard to the authors'
intention that they be merged or anything else, doesn't appear to me to make
any practical or theoretical sense.
Id. This clarification of the definition of joint works was apparently an attempt to avoid
the "12th Street Rag" situation where an addition is made to work having an independent
existence without the author's knowledge. Ringer's presentation was not merely "com-
ment" on the bill. Kaminstein, the chairman of the Panel of Consultants introduced
Ringer's presentation as "tie[ing] together [those] sections ... dealing with ownership."
Id.
74. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 68, at 27 1. Panel member Abe Goldman of the
Copyright Office, commenting on the inclusion of the "intention" phrase in the statute,
indicated the word "or" between the "collaboration" and "intent" phrases in the House
Report should be read as disjunctive, i.e., as "either/or." Id.
The reason for stating the second of the possibilities-that is, that they might
work with the intention of having their contributions merged-arises from a
case or two [i.e., Maurel and Marks] in which the courts have said that, even
though an author may work on part of what will be a combined work later, and
he doesn't even know who the other author may be, nevertheless, if each au-
thor, working separately and without knowledge of the other, knows at the time
he is creating his portion that what he's doing will become part of a joint work,
then it is to be considered a joint work. Collaboration ... connotes that the two
authors work together each knowing the other, each working with the other.
So I think the definition here is disjunctive.
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the statute.75 Extending common design, the House Report includes
a "knowledge" element76 in its interpretation of the definition of joint
work. Knowledge of the contributions of others in a work, however,
differs from subjectively intending that others coauthor a work. 7 By
allowing authors to work at different times while requiring their
awareness of other contributors, the knowledge element achieves the
drafters' purpose to expand joint authorship beyond strict collabo-
ration. 8
The House Report's explicit analysis of joint authorship rights in
motion pictures responded to reservations of the Motion Picture As-
sociation of America concerning imposition of a subjective standard
on "intent."79 The Motion Picture Association contended that "in-
tent" might "involve the question of the subjective intentions to col-
laborate ... particularly where licensees ... may have only objective
manifestations on which to rely."8 0 The House Report recognized
that authorship of a novel or play might be misconstrued as joint
ownership in the subsequent motion picture," and indicated that the
independent existence of the initial work supersedes the author's sub-
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of joint works). But see A. LATMAN, supra
note 47, at 229. "The new Act's definition emphasizes the authors' intent at the time the
writing is done and presumably attempts to contract, at least to some extent, the consid-
erable dilution of the collaborative intent requirement for joint works found in some cases
within the Second Circuit." Id. It appears that under Latman, a closer collaboration is
required. Yet the Panel did not include the term "collaboration" in the definition of joint
works.
76. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120.
77. In CCNV, the sculptor Reid knew the larger work was to include a pedestal, but
later claimed he did not have the state of mind that his work be part of a joint work. See
infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. In Easter Seal, the television station and the
Easter Seal Society knew they were working together on the videotapes of the parade.
See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. Even with this knowledge, they claimed
to lack the intent to jointly author it. The knowledge element merely requires the aware-
ness of the contributor to a joint work that others are contributing to a work. It does not
require that he intend the legal ramifications of his involvement in the creation of the
work.
78. The House Report indicates that the statute requires both knowledge and inten-
tion. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120. If an author knows he is collaborating on a joint
work or knows that his contribution will become part of a joint work, to additionally
require that he subjectively intend the unity of the parts when he manifestly allows the
merger to occur, is to place too great a burden on future licensees and other joint
author(s).
79. COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, pt. 2, DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF
THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 341 (Comm. Print 1963).
80. Id. at 359, § C ("Coownership and joint ownership - Licenses") (emphasis
added).
81. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120. "The definition of 'joint works' has prompted
some concern lest it be construed as converting the authors of previously written works,
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jective intent to coauthor a derivative work. 2 Additionally, intent
must exist at the time "the work is done," not at the time of concep-
tion.8 3 Thus, the author of a novel or play does not become author of
the movie based on his work merely because he subjectively intended
to coauthor both.
The genesis of the language in the 1976 Act (and the accompanying
House Report) confirms that the "intent" element in the definition of
joint work should be interpreted as an objective standard.
IV. Intent: Post-1976 Act Case Law
A. Subjective Standard
The authors' objective contributions to a joint work determine own-
ership. 4 Yet, in an effort to address the intent element of the statute,
such as plays, novels, and music, into coauthors of a motion picture in which their work
is incorporated." Id.
82. Id.
[A]lthough a novelist, playwright, or songwriter may write the work with the
hope or expectation [i.e., subjective intent] that it will be used in a motion pic-
ture, this is clearly a case of separate or independent authorship rather than one
where the basic intention behind the writing of the work was for motion picture
use.
Id. (emphasis added). The status of a work as "previously written" was the focal point of
the rights of ownership.
83. Id. "[The author] may write a work with the hope or expectation" [i.e., the author
may have the subjective intent] that it will be used in a motion picture, yet refute that
subjective intent by evidencing a different intent through his actions of creating the pri-
mary work. Id. (emphasis added).
Query: How does the House Report contemplate determining whether joint authorship
exists in the novel or the motion picture?
Example: An author, as an independent contractor, contributes to a story, like Star
Wars, with the subjective intent for it to be both a novel and a motion picture screenplay.
It is first produced in screenplay form and then as a novel. In which medium is he the
joint author? What if the novel was published first?
In the first instance (with the screenplay as the pre-existing work), the screenplay
would be the joint work, the novel-the derivative work. It would be vice versa in the
second instance.
The House Report recognizes that "[it is true that a motion picture would normally be
a joint rather than a collective work" if it were not for work for hire. H.R. REP., supra
note 3, at 120.
It is irrelevant that in the 1960s the drafters of House Report may not have contem-
plated a situation where authors rely on the popularity of the movie to sell the novel or
that motion picture screenwriters in the future may not work for hire.
The relevance is the emphasis the Report gives to the "clearly" obvious case where the
"pre-existing work" (in the Report's terminology) in and of itself evidences the author's
intent over any subjective intent he may have had while writing the work. Such emphasis
keeps this type of manifest intent squarely within the contemplation of Congress which
added the phrase "at the time the work is done" [rather than at the time the work is first
conceived] to qualify the intent element.
84. See supra notes 24-36, 45-47 and accompanying text.
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courts continue to summarily apply a state of mind standard. These
courts decide the issue of authorship through objective factors, and
then make a conclusory examination of subjective intent which sup-
ports the objectively based holding.
Rather than protecting authors, intent under the subjective stan-
dard more often denies ownership to rightful coauthors. After partici-
pating in the creation of a joint work, one author can claim he lacked
intent to jointly author a work, even though his actions manifest the
opposite intent.8 5 Alternately, a subsequent contributor to an existing
work can claim that the work was subjectively intended to be a joint
work. This claim of authorship based on subjective intent can deny
rights to a legitimate joint author as well as to assignees and licensees,
who must rely on objective means to discern copyright ownership.8 6
The subjective intent standard, through the misappropriation of own-
ership, erodes incentive to create, which is the primary policy of the
joint authorship doctrine.87 The subjective standard is particularly
problematic when it is used in determining coauthorship of derivative
works and in applying contract principles to joint works.
1. Derivative Works
A common misconception in interpreting the intent element of the
joint work definition is that subjective intent transforms the author of
a derivative work into a joint author of the initial work. Because a
derivative work is based on the initial work, the contribution of a de-
rivative author always follows creation of the initial work. Therefore,
adding to a work after its initial existence never vests joint ownership
in a later contributor.8 8 Additionally, joint ownership of the intial
work does not automatically vest coauthorship in a derivative work.89
a. Picture Music
The court in Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc. 9o mistakenly applied
85. See infra notes 136-37, 148-49, 150-52 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
90. 314 F. Supp. 640, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'don other grounds, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d
Cir. 1972). Picture Music utilized a subjective standard to determine the rights in the
1933 Walt Disney animated film "Three Little Pigs." The stars of this feature, the three
little pigs, each had a song about its preferred housing (straw, sticks or brick) with a
common refrain ("Who's Afraid Of The Big Bad Wolf"). A lyricist, Ann Ronell, from
the Irving Berlin organization, was hired to adapt the composition as a popular song and
was given credit on the song sheets. The cartoon writers, who received no similar recog-
nition for their contribution, complained. Disney modified the credits on the song sheets.
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subjective intent in determining coauthorship of a derivative work.
Picture Music correctly found no coauthorship due to lack of collabo-
ration between the initial authors 9' and the derivative author.92 Yet,
in an effort to address the impending 1976 Act, the court summarily
injected a subjective intent standard and held that the initial authors
did not "intend" to create a joint work with the subsequent author.93
The initial authors' subjective intent does not vest coauthorship of a
later author in the initial work. A contribution contemporaneous
with the creation of the initial work vests coownership in that work.
Although not recognized as such, Picture Music stands for the propo-
sition that a work having a previous independent existence cannot
qualify as part of a joint work. 94
b. Weissman
Some authorities have overextended the intent element to allow
that subjective intent alone vests joint ownership, even in the absence
of a contribution.95 In Weissman v. Freeman,96 Dr. Weissman collabo-
rated in scientific studies and reports with her former mentor, Dr.
The action to determine joint authorship was based on Disney's modification plus
Ronell's contention that she was owed a one half undivided interest in the song rather
than a quarter share of the royalties she had been paid. She also claimed the right as
owner to designate the music publisher. Ronell's rights were subsequently assigned and
then re-assigned to Picture Music, plaintiff in this case. Id.
91. See supra notes 29, 74-75 and accompanying text, explaining that strict collabora-
tion is not the only method of coauthoring a work.
92. Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. at 647 ("No joint authorship arose here. There was
no collaboration between Frank E. Churchill, the author of the source material, and Ann
Ronell [the derivative author]").
93. Id. Courts tend to summarily address the issue of subjective intent while claiming
it is the pivotal aspect of the property right. See Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F.Supp. 1248
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 219 (1989) (finding no coauthorship on the basis of no contribution to derivative
work, yet also addressing subjective intent). Additionally, the intention the Picture Music
court addressed was not the intention at the time of the work's creation, as required by
the House Report. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120. The court considered the subsequent
intent of the parties regarding rights vested in the existing work. Picture Music, 314
F.Supp. at 647. "It was not the intention of the parties that Miss Ronell should become a
joint owner of the source material or of the popular song so closely derived therefrom.
The original work was not transferred to her." Id. (emphasis added).
94. "The Three Little Pigs," the song whose rights were litigated in Picture Music,
had already existed as part of an animated film before the contributions of the subsequent
author. This independent pre-existence of the work disqualified the subsequent contribu-
tor as author of a joint work. Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. 640.
95. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
96. 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989) (Second Circuit holding that Dr. Freeman, then
Chief of the Nuclear Medicine Division at Montefiore, was not a joint author in the
derivative work prepared by his former student, Dr. Weissman, after their association
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Freeman. After their collaboration ended, Dr. Weissman edited one
of the reports, and added materials and photos.97 The district court
ruled that Dr. Freeman co-owned the paper, even though he did not
contribute any new material to the edited work.98 The district court
determined that, because Dr. Freeman jointly owned the initial work,
he also jointly owned the derivative work. The Second Circuit dis-
agreed, and reversed.99
The Second Circuit's opinion in Weissman v. Freeman supports a
new standard to expel the "Melancholy Baby" rationale"° from the
joint authorship doctrine. Under both the district court opinion in
Weissman 101 and the interpretation of "Melancholy Baby" in Nim-
mer's treatise,10 2 joint authorship rights extend to a derivative version
of the work when one initial author contributes to a second work and
the non-contributing initial author consents. 0 3 The Second Circuit
criticized this rationale as based on a "mistaken view that joint au-
thorship of the prior existing works automatically makes the two joint
authors coowners of the derivative work."' 4
In Weissman, the Second Circuit correctly determined that the
work created by the former medical student was derivative and not
joint. The derivative status of the second work was based on the same
had ended, and that Dr. Freeman owned only his own contribution in the derivative
work).
97. Id. at 1316.
98. Weissman, 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
99. Weissman, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
100. See supra notes 37-43, infra note 102 and accompanying text.
101. See Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1317.
102. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-18 to 6-19. "One situation may arise,
however, where a person may claim as joint author of a work although he has made no
contribution to it." Id. This is based on a construction of "Melancholy Baby" that recog-
nizes that if A is joint author of the first version with B, and B creates a second version, A
has joint authorship in that second version, even though A made no new contribution to
the second work. This conclusion is based on a subjective intent rationale requiring that
A consent to the secondary use. Even if A were joint owner of the second version on
these terms (which A is not), B would not need A's consent to create a derivative work,
since as a tenant-in-common, he has rights over the whole of the first version, and under
17 U.S.C. § 106, can license derivative works. This rationale requiring an element of
subjective intent is similar to that of Judge Pierce in his concurring appellate court opin-
ion, which would have given joint authorship status to Dr. Freeman had Dr. Weissman
consented to his joint authorship in the second work. Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F.
Supp. 1248, 1327 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989). Judge Pierce relies on Marks as authority, but in
Marks, the parts did not exist as independent entities before their merger.
103. 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-18 to 6-19. Since the second version of the
song incorporates part of the first, even if one of the original authors made no new contri-
bution, he would still be considered a joint author by virtue of his ownership of the first
version and its incorporation into the work. Id.
104. Weissman, 868 F.2d at 1317.
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analysis of any derivative work-because Dr. Freeman did not con-
tribute to the new work, his rights were in the initial work, not in the
derivative work. 105
After correctly imposing an objective standard requiring contribu-
tion to the new work, the Second Circuit summarily addressed the
issue of subjective intent. 106 Despite the court's attention to this issue,
however, subjective intent was irrelevant. Dr. Weissman's byline on
the report and Dr. Freeman's lack of objection to the omission of his
name from the report did not create or destroy ownership rights. 10 7
Additionally, the subjective intent factors occurred after the creation
105. Id. at 1318.
Dr. Freeman conceded that he had not participated in drafting the new matter
included in P-1, it follows as a logical corrollary, therefore, that he acquired no
interest in or right to use P-I beyond those rights which he had as co-author in
the prior joint material incorporated into P-I. Even though one co-author has
the right to revise a joint work in order to create an individual derivative work,
the other co-author acquires no property rights in the newly created work pre-
pared without his involvement.
Id. An analogy can be made to the rights of the author of a novel in the movie based on
the novel. The novelist owns only his own contribution in the movie and is not a co-
owner of the movie itself.
106. Id. at 1318.
107. The following is a "Looking Glass" analysis of the subjective intent factors con-
sidered by the court of appeals in Weissman. First, the events as they occurred and the
resulting ownership status of the parties are indicated. The court's perspective-which
was to look at the position of the parties without intent-is then reversed and this hypo-
thetical analysis regards the events of Weissman as though the parties had the requisite
state of mind to be coauthors (hypothetical elements are italicized).
1) 1984: Weissman and Freeman create joint work. Weissman's rights in the work:
owner. Freeman's rights in the work: owner.
2) Same facts as 1), but Freeman forms subjective intent that Freeman is to be joint
author in any future work of Weissman's based on the original work. "He could not have
formed intent to contribute to her then non-existent work." See Weissman, 868 F.2d at
1320.
3) 1985: Weissman edits work, adds new material, rearranges old material. Freeman
does not contribute. Weissman subjectively intends Freeman to be a joint author. Weiss-
man's rights in new work: owner of derivative work. Freeman's rights in new work:
owner (because of Freeman's prior intent to own Weissman'sfuture works and Weissman's
present intent to share ownership).
"Had Dr. Weissman... intended the work to be joint-Dr. Freeman could have been
deemed a joint author simply by virtue of his contributions to the earlier work." Id. at
1327 (Pierce, J., concurring). "Yet, there is no evidence that they intended their joint
product to be forever indivisible like the finite whole of the completed single song in
Marks." Id. at 1319 "[Weissman's] use of her own by-line ... constitutes prima facia
proof that this work was not intended to be joint ... In fact, Dr. Freeman lectured at the
same meeting at which [the derivative work] was first presented, and made no objection
to the omission of his name from it." Id. at 1320.
4) 1987: Freeman uses the derivative work. Because Freeman is joint author due to
his subjective intent and that of Weissman, he needs no permission to use the new work
This analysis illustrates that the subjective intent standard produces absurd results.
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of the work and did not meet the House Report requirement that the
intent exist "at the time the writing is done."' 8
Weissman directly clarifies one widely misunderstood aspect of
copyright law imposed on prospective joint authors, and inadvertently
addresses a second. First, to be a joint author, a party must contrib-
ute to a work not having a prior existence. 0 9 Second, subjective in-
tent does not advance an understanding of who actually authored the
work. A subjective standard only demonstrates the parties' state of
mind regarding the legal consequences of their actions, not the actual
legal consequences. 10
The equities concerning coauthors, like Dr. Freeman, who do not
contribute to a derivative work are not skewed by Weissman. Often,
the heart of a derivative work is newly updated material or new con-
clusions drawn by the derivative author based on previously written
material. Coauthors still retain full ownership rights in the original
work, and are due an accounting"'. for the use of the original in the
derivative version. Therefore, Weissman preserves the equities be-
tween the parties and advances Congress's purpose in enacting the
definition of joint works.
2. Contracts: Implied Intent
In his copyright law treatise, Nimmer conditions the creation of a
joint work on the prior existence of an implied agreement. 1 2 While
no implied agreement is necessary for inseparable contributions,
Nimmer requires an implied or express agreement when contributions
are interdependent, if one contribution preceded the other.' 13 This
agreement criterion apparently evolved from Nimmer's interpretation
of intent. Yet, Marks, which Nimmer cites regularly as authority on
common design, 1 14 did not require the first author even know the sec-
ond author." 5 The 1976 Act did not allude to agreement-the House
Report merely stated there must be "knowledge ... [by the first au-
108. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120.
109. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text. But see 1 NIMMER, supra note 16,
§ 6.03, at 6-10 ("if intent as to legal consequences is to be the touchstone").
111. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 121. "Under the bill as under the present law, coown-
ers of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common, with each coowner
having an independent right to use or license the use of a work, subject to a duty of
accounting to the other coowners for any profits." Id.
112. 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.02, at 6-4 to 6-5.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-6 n.3 (construing Edward B.
Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944)).
115. Marks, 140 F.2d 266.
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thor] that [the work will] be merged with the contributions of other
authors."'1 6 Neither Marks, which formulated the common design
precursor of intent, nor the House Report requires a contractual
agreement for joint authorship. Thus, Nimmer's criterion appears to
be an invention without support in prior case law or statute.
In Boggs v. Japp,17 the court regarded lack of agreement as evi-
dence negating joint authorship." ' The plaintiff in Boggs contributed
sketches, a recipe and plot suggestions, which other courts considered
sufficient for coauthorship." 9 Yet, because the parties reached no
contractual agreement prior to creation of the work, the Boggs court
denied ownership to the plaintiff.'2 ° This denial of property rights
based solely on the lack of a written instrument does not comply with
the language of the statute.
Although the statute explicitly provides for a writing in work for
hire situations,' 2 ' the 1976 Act's definition of joint authorship has no
provision for a written agreement. Easter Seal Society for Crippled
Children & Adults of La., Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises (Easter Seal)'22
and Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 23 while
rejecting a work for hire claim because of the lack of a written agree-
ment, regarded joint authorship as an alternative. 2 4 Both Easter Seal
116. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120.
117. 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 126,347 (E.D.Va. July 20, 1988) (illustrator
Boggs submitted sketches and plot ideas for children's storybook about abandoned jam
and jelly factory; court held there was no evidence defendant Japp chose Boggs to illus-
trate the book or that an agreement to create joint work existed between them).
118. Despite the opinion of the court, the statutory definition of joint authorship does
not require a written agreement. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see infra notes 121-28 and ac-
companying text.
119. See Community For Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (CCNV), 846 F.2d 1485
(D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989); Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815
F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988); Strauss v. Hearst, 1988 Copy-
right L. Rep. (CCH) 26,244, at 21,717 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988); Mister B Textiles v.
Woodcrest Fabrics, 523 F.Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Though plot may be characterized
as an idea, the sketches and recipe in Boggs could certainly qualify as expressions and
could have qualified the plaintiff for authorship. I NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-
18.
120. Boggs, [1989 Transfer Binder 2] Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) $ 26,347, at 26,347,
22,219. "There is no evidence that the parties ever intended that they be co-authors. A
contract was never made, agreed upon or entered into and the parties never reached any
type of agreement [i.e., there was no meeting of the minds]. Further, Japp [defendant]
testified that all she was ever interested in was locating an illustrator." Id.
121. In the definition of work for hire as regarding independent contractors, a writing
is required. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See infra note 166 and accompanying text explain-
ing work for hire.
122. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
123. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
124. Id. at 1495.
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and CCNV disregard Nimmer's "implied agreement" in interdepen-
dent contributions. Easter Seal found coauthorship even though "the
parties . . . refused to acknowledge it,"' 25 thereby regarding the
merger of the parties' efforts as sufficient evidence of their intent.
CCNV, also finding that work for hire was not implicated, determined
that the contribution itself evidenced the intent to create a joint
work.' 26 Thus, these courts found there was a possibility of joint au-
thorship even where an ownership agreement was absent. A recently
proposed Senate bill would require a written contract prior to joint
authorship. 27 The Register of Copyrights, however, has expressed
reservations that a contract provision would deny authorship to those
currently protected by the 1976 Act.128
B. Contemporary Common Design: Manifesting Objective Intent
Through Contribution
The common design theory established by the pre-1976 Act case
law survives in current case law.' 29 Although the 1976 Act did not
125. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 337.
126. CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1496-97 ("most prominently undercutting Reid's claim of sole
authorship [was] that CCNV was the motivating factor ... conceived the idea ... di-
rected [Reid's] efforts").
127. S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
128. Hearings on S. 1253 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trade-
marks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter
1989 Hearings] (comments of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights) (transcript available
through the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary).
S. 1253 also requires that for all specially ordered or commissioned works, the
parties must, before commencement of the work, enter into a signed agreement
stating that the work is to be one of joint authorship .... I am unsure how it
would work in practice. Assume, for example, that the producer of an audiovi-
sual work for elementary schools commissions a friend who is a composer to
write some music for the work; the two work closely with the producer giving
detailed comments and suggestions for both the original draft and subsequent
revisions of the music ... and the composer giving suggestions for revision of
the visual component of the work .... The only agreement is an oral one to
split the profits 75% - 25%. Under CCNV v. Reid, it is unlikely the music
would be deemed made for hire. Under the existing statute, the work would
qualify as a joint work. Under S. 1253, though, the work could not be a joint
work since no written agreement to that effect was entered into. The question
then arises, who owns what rights? The audiovisual work here consists of 'in-
separable or interdependent parts' that are useful only as part of a 'unitary
whole.' The easy answer is to say each owns rights in his or her contribution,
but this answer gets you no place where each contribution is only marketed as
part of the unitary whole. I do not see how the work could be anything but a
joint work, a result prohibited by S. 1253.
Id. (footnote omitted).
129. See Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in
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explicitly characterize it as such, common design is the intent element
in the definition of joint work. To premise the formidable property
rights endowed through joint authorship on an ephemeral state of
mind standard deprives authors, assignees and licensees of predict-
ability concerning their rights. The common design standard, in
which joint laboring determines ownership, conforms with the protec-
tive purpose of Congress 3 ' in formulating the intent element in the
joint work definition.
Recently, the court in Strauss v. Hearst Corp. "' followed the com-
mon design doctrine by determining the intent of the parties from
their actions in creating the work, 132 rather than from their subjective
intent. 33 The Strauss court held that Popular Mechanics magazine's
part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313, 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989)
(quoting 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-6 (construing Marks and "Melancholy
Baby" in regard to intent) ("[tihe essence of a joint work is 'a joint laboring in further-
ance of a preconcerted common design' "); Boggs v. Japp, [1989 Transfer Binder 2]
Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,347, at 22,219 (E.D. Va. July 20, 1988) (citing 1 NIMMER,
supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-18); Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1
26,244, at 21,717, 21,722 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988) (citing I NIMMER, supra note 14,
§ 6.06[A], at 6-14)); Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 702 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(citing the common design cases of Marks and "Melancholy Baby" as interpreting intent);
Rodak v. Esprit Racing Team, 1986 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,883, at 20,024 (S.D.
Ohio 1985) (citing Marks in regard to intent to form a whole); S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., (1989); 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-6 (construing Levy, Maurel, Marks,
"[w]ithout such a preconcerted common design the resulting combination should not be
regarded as a joint work"). Nimmer equates intention with common design: "[t]he pre-
concerted common design, or, in the words of the 1976 Act, 'the intention that their
contributions be merged.' " Id.
130. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text, explaining that Congress intended
to differentiate joint works from derivative and collective works.
131. 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) T 26,244, 21,7122 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988) (pho-
tographer claimed Popular Mechanics magazine infringed his copyright in photos of fish-
ing gear, but court determined that the parties were joint authors because they intended a
unitary whole by "work[ing] pursuant to a preconcerted common design") (citing 1 NIM-
MER, supra note 16, § 6.06 [A], at 6-14).
132. Strauss, 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) at 21,722.
Here there is no doubt that Strauss and Popular Mechanics intended that 'their
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary
whole.... [Strauss] was careful to leave space in the composition of the photo-
graph that would accommodate [any] future additions .... Add to those truths
the fact that ... Popular Mechanics' graphic editor designed the layout for the
photo ... and that other artists and technicians hired by Popular Mechanics
retouched significant portions of the photo, and the conclusion is inescapable
that pages 86 and 87 of the April 1985 issue constituted a joint work.
Id.
133. Strauss, 1988 Copyright L. Rep.(CCH) 26,244, at 21,722 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19,
1988) (citing I NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.06 [A], at 6.14) ("[i]n a joint work ... where
both authors work pursuant to a preconcerted common design ) (emphasis added); but see
Strauss, 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) at 21,719 ("Strauss and the magazine never en-
tered into a written contract formalizing their business relationship").
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contributions (initial conceptualization, continual supervision and
creative input) to a photo layout of fishing equipment merged with
Strauss's photograph. 34 The court in Strauss indicated these mani-
fest elements of common design constituted an intent to merge into a
unitary whole.'35
An emerging trend toward a subjective intent standard was
quashed by the Strauss court. Although Strauss contended he had no
"subjective intent" to create a joint work, 136 the court decided that he
could not avoid the legal consequences of his acts. 137
Strauss also considered the limitation of a joint author's rights in
the work. Prior to Strauss, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co. 138
held that the reservation of licensing rights evidenced a sole author-
ship intent.' 39 Refuting this contention, however, the Strauss court
indicated that given the contributions and other factors that evidence
an intent to merge, first publication rights only enumerate subsequent
assignment or licensing rights and do not determine initial ownership
rights."4 In other words, joint authors can subsequently contract
away their rights, but a contract will not alter the vesting of the initial
tenancy-in-common.' 4'
134. Although the factors extracted by the Strauss court establish the viability of the
common design theory through the requirement of objective contributions by all parties
to a joint work, the copyrightability doctrine would not recognize all of the magazine's
contributions as such because they do not rise above the level of ideas. See infra notes
247-65 and accompanying text. This Note would bifurcate Strauss: recognizing it as
support for the demise of a subjective intent element, while criticizing it as allowing less
than expressions to qualify as contributions.
135. Strauss, 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) at 21,722.
136. Id. at 21,722 n.5. The court notes that Strauss denied having an intent to create
joint copyright: "such joint ownership was never discussed with me, and I would never
have consented to it if it had been." Id. (citing Affidavit of Strauss 5).
137. Id.
Such self-serving proclamations [concerning Strauss's intent not to create a
joint copyright] are unavailing. Even though Strauss may not have intended the
legal consequences that attach to his actions, he does not deny he that he still
had the requisite intent to participate in the creation of pages 86 and 87 in the
manner described.
Id. (emphasis added). This participation element used to be called common design.
138. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (reservation of rights by one or more authors held
inconsistent with joint author concept); see 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-10
n.20.
139. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 22.
140. As when an author assigns or licenses rights he already has in the work. Strauss
v. Hearst Corp., 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,244, at 21,722 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
19, 1988) (construing the words "First Publication Right In U.S. And Foreign" as indica-
tive of "parties' respective rights as joint copyright holders .... Thus it may have been
that Hearst by such language did agree to limit its natural rights as a joint holder").
141. See infra note 147 and accompanying text, indicating that the Easter Seal court
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In Easter Seal,'42 the contributions of a television station's person-
nel' 43 qualified the station as coauthor with the Easter Seal Society
(the Society) in a videotaped parade scene. The court viewed the ef-
fort to create a unitary work as the dispositive factor in that "[they]
worked cooperatively ... to create the field tapes."'"
The Easter Seal court decided that the contribution of the broad-
casters was not merely fixation' 45-not merely the setting of an ex-
pression in a tangible medium. The broadcasters' direction and
commentary merged with the efforts of the sports club to constitute
joint authorship.'46 Easter Seal's recognition that contracts do not
create joint authorship,'47 but establish rights after joint authorship
has vested, accords with the recognition in Strauss that reservation of
rights does not determine initial ownership. In Easter Seal, subjective
intent was not relevant to coauthorship status. Although the Society
considered itself the sole owner of the tapes, and regarded the televi-
made an analogous finding regarding vesting of ownership and subsequent or prior limi-
tation of rights.
142. 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988) (New Orleans
television station WYES videotaped parade for use on Easter Seal telethon. Court found
work for hire did not exist under literal interpretation of that doctrine's definition in the
1976 Act; in dictum, court determined joint authorship might have existed because
WYES contributed work of authorship).
143. Id. at 337. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining work-for-hire). Employees in a
work for hire situation make the employer a joint author for the purposes of ownership.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982).
144. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 337.
145. Id.; but see Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F.Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981) (indicating fixation
in itself equals creation). See infra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
146. Easter Seal, 815 F.2d at 337 (construing H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 52 and cases
cited therein).
When a football game ... is being covered by four television cameras, with a
director guiding the activities of the four cameramen and choosing which of
their electronic images are sent out to the public and in what order, there is
little doubt that what the cameramen and the director are doing constitutes
'authorship.'
Id. (citing H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 52).
147. The Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal determined that previous cases involving sports
clubs and broadcasters related only to the construction of contracts and did not address
the issue of initial coauthorship. Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 336-
37, cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
The sports cases are not as broad as the Society might wish. They involve dis-
putes over royalties and claims between sports clubs and third parties, not di-
rect copyright disputes between sports clubs and broadcasters. [The Baltimore
Orioles] case does not hold that the clubs are 'authors' of the broadcasts,
although, as a practical matter, the bargaining position of a sports team will
generally allow it to claim the broadcast copyrights by contract with the radio
or television broadcaster.
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sion station as merely the instrumentality of fixation, 148 the court de-
cided joint authorship does not require agreement. 149
In CCNV,15° the intent of the parties to merge their contributions
related not to their state of mind,15 ' but to their actual contribu-
tions-their "labor[ing] to create ... a unitary whole."'' 52 By disre-
garding the subjective intent of the sculptor Reid,'53 the D.C. Circuit
indicated that the factors which "most prominently undercut[] Reid's
claim of sole authorship"' 54 were the contributions of CCNV, the
commissioning party. The crucial factor was the merger of the two
contributions into an interdependent whole; neither Reid's sculpture
nor CCNV's pedestal had an independent existence without the other.
The fact that the parties worked apart was not dispositive of the in-
dependent existence of the parts.
55
CCNV referred to certain subjective elements of the parties' rela-
tions; 5 6 these elements, however, pertained not to the creation of the
work, but to the attitudes of the parties after the work was completed.
Therefore, these factors were not dispositive of the authorship status
of the parties because, as the House Report indicates, 57 the intent
which vests authorship is the intent "at the time the writing is
done.",1' 8
In Strauss, Easter Seal, and CCNV, the objective standard pre-
served the equities between the parties. 9 In Strauss, the photogra-
148. Id. at 336. The Society contended that "WYES merely provided the mechanical
fixation of those works in a 'tangible medium.'" Id.
149. Id. at 337 ("[a]lthough the parties have refused to acknowledge it ... it seems
clear to us that [their contributions] were interdependent joint works of authorship").
150. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
151. Id. at 1495. "Reid contends he is the sole author and exclusive owner of the
copyright. We now state why the record before us does not establish that contention."
Id.
152. Id. at 1496.
153. Id. "Reid [recognized that he did not] solely 'author' the steam grate portion of
the sculpture .... he questions whether CCNV is the author of the base, and whether the
base is copyrightable." Id.
154. Id. at 1496-97. Whether those contributions are merely "ideas" or expressions
and therefore rise to a level of copyrightable material would depend not on which party
fixed them but on their level of detail.
155. CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1496, aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989) (joint authors
need not work in physical propinquity).
156. Id. at 1496. "CCNV transported the entire work to Reid ... for the needed
repair .... Reid retained the entire construction, not just the figures he had sculpted."
Id.
157. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120.
158. Id.
159. In Strauss, Easter Seal, and CCNV, commissioning parties sought to renounce the
subjective intent standard. Although the rationale used to support common design ap-
pears to support mere supervision as contributing to a joint work, it does not. The indi-
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pher's taking of the photograph merged with the magazine's
designing of the layout and retouching of the photograph."6 The
photographer alone could not have created the work. Thus, the con-
tributions of the magazine justified its status as coauthor. In Easter
Seal, the videotape was created through collaboration, the classic ex-
ample of joint authorship; to vest authorship in the Society alone
would ignore the efforts of the television camera crew and directors.
In CCNV, CCNV's pedestal and Reid's sculpture merged into one
work: the pedestal's value depended on its use with the sculpture. 161
CCNV clearly manifested the policy behind the joint authorship doc-
trine; CCNV could not exploit its contribution alone. In Hand's anal-
ogy, the pedestal was the "husk" from which the "kernel"-the
sculpture-was taken away. 
62
V. Joint Authorship Criteria: Authorship, Intention, Merger
The recent unanimous Supreme Court decision in CCNV 63 em-
braced a literal interpretation of the 1976 Act's definition of work for
vidual contributions of the parties must rise to the level of a copyrightable expression for
statutory protection to attach. Even those protecting freelance artists' rights reject a sub-
jective standard in the definition of joint work. 1989 Hearings, supra note 28, at 65-66
(statement of Richard Weisgrau, Executive Director, American Society of Magazine
Photographers). Weisgrau has stated that:
the definition of joint work is so subjective that it stands as an open invitation to
litigants to make a joint work argument in any case in which more than one
person had some involvement, no matter how minimal, with the work produced
by the freelance artist .... Under current law, the client can always make the
argument, however specious it may be, that the parties intended to create an
interdependent whole and thus that the final product of the photographer's
work qualifies as a joint work.
This Note does not advocate a minimal contribution requirement, other than that the
contribution be copyrightable. See infra notes 190-228 and accompanying text.
160. The court indicates that the photographer and the magazine were coauthors in
pages 86 and 87. Strauss v. Hearst, 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,244, at 21,722
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). This would have created joint authorship in the magazine article,
rather than in the photo. The court was endeavoring to show that Strauss knew his work
would be incorporated into a greater whole, the magazine article. Actually Strauss' ef-
forts in taking the photograph merged with the magazine's efforts in designing and re-
touching the photograph.
161. See CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1495-97 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct.
2166 (1989).
162. Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d
Cir. 1944). See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
163. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989). The Second Cir-
cuit in CCNV held that sculptor Reid's contribution to the artwork "Third World
America," depicting homeless people huddling over a streetside grate, was not work for
hire. The court based its holding on a literal interpretation of the definition of work for
hire in the 1976 Act. The sculptor's status as an independent contractor, the lack of
conformity to the nine categories listed in statutory definition qualifying commissioned
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hire' 61 over the erroneous expansions constructed by the lower
courts.1 65 Under the statutory definition, the work for hire doctrine
confers authorship on employers for employees' creations and on
commissioners for nine specific categories of works created by in-
dependent contractors under a prior written agreement.1 66 The Court
rejected expansion of the work for hire doctrine which granted au-
thorship to commissioners of works not within a strict reading of the
statute. 167
At the close of the CCNV opinion, the Court, allowing that
coauthorship could constitute a viable alternate legal theory on re-
mand, quoted the statutory joint work definition verbatim.1 68 This
direct quote from the statute mandates a strict application of the stat-
utory definition in joint authorship.1 69 In construing work for hire,
the Court reasoned that "strict adherence to the language and struc-
ture of the Act is particularly appropriate where, as here, the statute
is the result of a series of carefully crafted compromises,"'' 70 and that
failure to strictly interpret the statute would unravel the "'carefully
worked out compromise aimed at balancing legitimate interests on
both sides.' ",171 This rationale has equal force in the joint authorship
doctrine. The 1976 Act drafters carefully constructed the joint work
definition to "balance" the interests of joint authors, granting them
more careful consideration than authors of sole, derivative and collec-
works as work for hire and lack of written agreement between the parties were all con-
tributing factors in the court's decision. Id.
164. "Work for hire" is commonly substituted for the longer term, "work made for
hire," used in the 1976 Act. See, e.g., CCNV, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (using both terms).
165. See id. at 2178. "Transforming a commissioned work into a work by an employee
on the basis of the hiring party's right to control, or actual control of, the work is incon-
sistent with the language, structure, and legislative history of the work for hire provi-
sions." Id.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of work for hire).
167. CCNV, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4612. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
168. Id. at 4613.
However, as the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals made clear, CCNV nevertheless may be a
joint author of the sculpture if, on remand, the [d]istrict [c]ourt so determines
that CCNV and Reid prepared the work 'with the intention that their contribu-
tions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.' In
that case, CCNV and Reid would be co-owners of the copyright in the work.
Id. (citations omitted).
169. See S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § II, at 1 (1989). "The first [clarification to the
definition of joint work] would make explicit the requirement that each author of a joint
work contribute ... copyrightable... subject matter to the work." Id. This supports an
interpretation of the joint work definition which would require authorship and
copyrightability.
170. CCNV, 57 U.S.L.W. at 4611 n.14 (citations omitted).
171. Id. at 4611 (quoting legislative history of the act) (citations omitted).
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tive works. 17 2
Joint authorship is not the panacea to the problem of the 1976
Act's narrowly drawn work for hire definition. Granting ownership
to one who has not authored the work undermines the very core of
the joint authorship doctrine. To include commissioning parties as
authors in the scope of joint works would expand the definition of
"authors" beyond a literal interpretation of the statute. 7 3 Various
172. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
173. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of joint works) (requiring authorship and contri-
bution); see infra notes 181-86 (indicating joint work requires authorship). It has been
proposed that the solution to the inapplicability of the work for hire definition to certain
commissioned works might be an application of the joint work definition. Joint author-
ship status would be assured through a prior written agreement. This proposal is flawed
in two respects. If a work does not qualify for protection under work for hire-the excep-
tion specifically envisioned by Congress-why should it qualify under joint work? To
endow ownership rights on a party who is not an author is just work for hire in another
guise. In such a scenario, the author is given ownership as well, which puts him in a
better position than work for hire. But there still is no basis for bestowing authorship on
a commissioning party other than to reward that party for funding the project. Taking
the concept of paying for the project to its fullest, even buyers of a finished work could
claim they paid for it, they own the copyright. Additionally, as coauthors, independent
contractors share in both licensing rights and control over licensing rights, therein leav-
ing commissioning parties with no control over the independent contractor's licensing
choices.
Ralph Oman, the Register of Copyrights, has expressed reservations regarding the op-
eration of the writing requirement to establish joint authorship of commissioned works.
1989 Hearings, supra note 128 (comments of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights).
S. 1253 also requires that for all specially ordered or commissioned works, the
parties must, before commencement of the work, enter into a signed agreement
stating that the work is to be one of joint authorship .... I am unsure how it
would work in practice. Assume, for example, that the producer of an audiovi-
sual work for elementary schools commissions a friend who is a composer to
write some music for the work; the two work closely, with the producer giving
detailed comments and suggestions for both the original draft and subsequent
revisions of the music ... and the composer giving suggestions for revision of
the visual component of the work .... The only agreement is an oral one to split
the profits 75% - 25%. Under CCNV v. Reid, it is unlikely the music would be
deemed made for hire. Under the existing statute, the work would qualify as a
joint work. Under S. 1253, though, the work could not be a joint work since no
written agreement to that effect was entered into. The question then arises, who
owns what rights? The audiovisual work here consists of 'inseparable or inter-
dependent parts' that are useful only as part of a 'unitary whole.' The easy
answer is to say each owns rights in his or her contribution, but this answer gets
you no place where each contribution is only marketed as part of the unitary
whole. I do not see how the work could be anything but a joint work, a result
prohibited by S.1253.
Id. (footnote omitted). The Register has raised a valid point-a work which would be
considered joint under the current statute, simply for lack of a writing, would not be joint
under the proposed bill. This would deny rights to authors, by not allowing them to fully
utilize their contribution. Furthermore, a mode of endowing rights on commissioning
parties already exists. Commissioning parties can license or have rights in the work as-
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applications of the joint authorship doctrine ignore the copyright-
ability doctrine,' 74 as though prefixing "co-" on the word "author"
changes the components of authorship.' 75 Erroneous expansions of
authorship within the joint authorship doctrine include: the "de
minimis doctrine,"' 76 the "fixer" qualifying as creator without author-
ing the expression, 7 7 and ideas qualifying as contributions in a joint
work. 178
Courts seeking to apply the doctrine of joint authorship have the
language of the statute as a guide. 1 The 1976 Act defines joint work
as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that
their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts
of a unitary whole."' 80 The definition clearly requires authorship, in-
tention, and merger.
A. Authorship And Copyrightability
An original work of authorship, fixed in a tangible medium, and
embodying an expression rather than an idea, qualifies for protection
under copyright law.' 8 ' This is the copyrightability doctrine. A work
not fulfilling the requirements of the copyrightability doctrine will not
garner protection under the statute.
The natural corollary to the copyrightability doctrine is that an au-
thor under the auspices of the statute must create a copyrightable
work. The 1976 Act creates the rare exception to copyrightability
through the work for hire doctrine;'82 no analogous exception is made
signed to them prior to the creation of the work. An axiom of copyright created through
the enactment of the 1976 Act is that ownership of the physical work does not confer
ownership of the copyright. Conferring ownership in the copyright of a work merely
because one has commissioned the work (as in a work of art or a song) is the equivalent of
conferring ownership because one has bought the object itself. Through assignment of
the work, a system exists for the author to regain ownership through termination after a
period of time. Moreover, commissioning parties have strong bargaining power. These
provisions allowing for assignment and licensing of rights in the work and termination
exhibit the protection Congress sought to endow on authors.
174. For a definition of the components of the copyrightability doctrine, see infra note
181 and accompanying text.
175. See S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S7343 (daily ed. June 22,
1989) ("Congress never intended to allow one who does not meet the constitutional stan-
dard of authorship to become a coowner of all copyright rights in that work").
176. See infra notes 201-16 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 247-65 and accompanying text.
179. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of joint work).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1982).
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982) (determining that "[i]n ... work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for
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for joint authorship. I8 3 The definition of joint work in the 1976 Act
incorporates the term "authors." 8 4 Therefore, to be a coauthor,"' a
contributor to a joint work must fulfill the requirements of
copyrightability. '8 6
In CCNV, the D.C. Circuit constructed a format for analyzing au-
thorship of a joint work through elements of the copyrightability. 8 7
Although CCNV's analysis itself is often problematic,'8 8 the opinion
provides a useful schematic.. As recognized in CCNV and in the 1976
Act, the key elements of copyrightability are originality, fixation and
expression. 189
1. Originality
Originality in authorship is "little more than a prohibition [against]
actual copying' 190 or an owing of creation to the author.' 9' Author
has been held to mean "'he to whom anything owes its origin, origi-
nator, maker.' ,192
Though the contribution of a prospective author to a joint work
must be original, 93 courts differ as to the requisite degree of original-
purposes of this title"). This is an exception to § 102(a), requiring authorship to garner
the statute's protection. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
183. See infra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
184. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
185. See PATRY, supra note 46, at 116. "In addition to the requisite intent, a putative
joint author must make some genuine contribution to the work's creation." Id.; see
Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 981 (1988) (finding contribution of joint author to be original and therefore copy-
rightable). "To the extent that the Society is claiming that WYES provided only mechan-
ical fixation... without the requisite originality and creativity for making a copyrightable
work, we reject their contention out of hand .... This work was a work of authorship."
Id.
186. See supra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
187. CCNV, 846 F.2d 1485, 1495-97 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989);
see infra note 189 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 235, 248-65 and accompanying text, criticizing CCNrs analysis of
the joint authorship doctrine.
189. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), which explicitly extends copyright protection to origi-
nal works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.
190. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 2:2, at 23 (rev. ed. 1988) [hereinafter N.
BOORSTYN] (citing Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir.
1951) and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903)).
191. H. HENN, COPYRIGHT LAW 49 (1988) [hereinafter H. HENN] (citing Original
Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (1 1th Cir. 1982); see also H.
HENN, supra, at 48: "[d]ecisional law indicates that authorship has two essential compo-
nents: (1) [e]xpenditure of a modicum of intellectual effort; and (2) [o]riginality."
192. N. BOORSTYN, supra note 190, § 2:3, at 24 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic
Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)).
193. S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S7341-44 (daily ed. June 22,
1989). This bill, in redefining joint authorship, would require "original" authorship be
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ity. Two directions have developed in joint authorship originality:
the sole authorship standard and the "de minimis" doctrine.
a. The Sole Authorship Standard of Originality
A sole author must fulfill originality standards indicating the work
is his own creation. Recognizing that "the standard for determining
whether a creation is an 'original work of authorship' is not high,"
CCNV adopted the same standard for joint authorship as in sole au-
thorship.'94 In adopting this standard, CCNV indicated that "'[i]t
suffices if the author refrains from copying from prior works and con-
tributes more than a minimal amount of creativity.' "'9 Also adopt-
ing the sole authorship standard, the court in Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc.
v. Material Things,'96 found that even the expansion of an original
design so as to "permit repetition of the floral design"' 9 7 was sufficient
to fulfill the minimum quantum of originality in the textile field.' 9 "
Additionally, the court in Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics,
Inc. 9 9 concluded that
[o]riginality means that the work owes its creation to the author
and this in turn means that the work must not consist of actual
copying .... The test of originality is concededly one with a low
threshold in that "[aill that is needed ... is that the 'author' con-
tributed something more than a 'merely trivial' variation, some-
thing recognizably 'his own.' 2°
added to clarify that definition. While this Note supports the position that contributions
in a joint work must be copyrightable, the definition of authorship in and of itself embod-
ies the concept of originality, therein making this addition extraneous.
194. CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1485, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166
(1989) (construing and quoting LATMAN, supra note 47, at 29). CCNV indicates that the
contribution of each author must be more than de minimus, but the court appears to
interpret a de minimus contribution in the same sense as for all copyrightable works,
rather than espousing Picture Music's standard which would require more for joint
works. See 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.03, at 6-9 to 10; see also infra notes 201-16 and
accompanying text.
195. CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1496 (construing LATMAN, supra note 47, at 29).
196. 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that textile converter, pro-
ducing printed fabrics for sale to garment manufacturers, was not joint author because it
contributed only suggestion and nothing tangible to work).
197. Id. at 1042-43 (construing Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc.,
490 F.2d 1092, 1094 (2d Cir. 1984)).
198. Id.
199. 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that employee's instruction to design
firm to make modifications based on unlicensed photograph constituted sufficient contri-
bution for joint authorship of employer with design firm). This Note bifurcates Mister B
because that case incorrectly elevated supervision to the level of contribution. See infra
notes 247-65, rejecting supervision as contribution in joint authorship.
200. Id. at 25 (quoting the standard from L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (citations omitted)).
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b. Originality And The De Minimis Doctrine: Is One Too Few, Are
Two Enough?
A line of cases following the "de minimis" rationale of Picture Mu-
sic, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc."'1 has modified the sole authorship standard
of originality and requires a "substantial and significant"2 °2 contribu-
tion, more than the minimal amount of creativity required for sole
authorship.20 3 In his treatise, Nimmer indicates2 4 that
under Picture Music something more than the minimal copyright
standard of 'distinguishable variation' must be added by a later
contribution in order to permit a finding that the resulting product
constitutes a joint work. How much more is unclear, though the
court seems to imply that the later contribution must be so 'sub-
stantial and significant' as to permit an inference that the parties
intended a joint ownership. 0 5
In interpreting originality, Nimmer creates a meaning for "de
minimis" beyond the Copyright Office Compendium's definition.20 6
Nimmer's "de minimis" requirement apparently originated as an ex-
tention to his questionable theory that uncopyrightable ideas can
201. 314 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 997 (1972). As a reaction to the fusion of effort standard of "12th Street Rag,"
Picture Music has been rendered obsolete. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modified on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that
a piano solo having an independent existence, after being assigned to the music publisher,
could be considered a joint work when coupled with lyrics); see 1 NIMMER, supra note 16,
§ 6.03, at 6-9: "[a] modification of the '12th Street Rag' doctrine was contained in Picture
Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., the 'Three Little Pigs' case." This fusion of effort standard
vested coauthorship in a subsequent contributor to a work having an independent exist-
ence. The House Report accompanying the 1976 Act requires the existence of an inten-
tion to create a joint work "at the time the writing is done," thereby disallowing the
creation of joint ownership in a pre-existing independent work and expressly discarding
the fusion of effort doctrine espoused by "12th Street Rag."
202. See Picture Music, 314 F. Supp. at 647. "[A] more substantial and significant
contribution was required to reach a finding of joint ownership." Id.; see H.R. Rep.,
supra note 3, at 120.
203. See 1 NIMMER § 6.03, supra note 16, at 6-9 to 10. "[M]ore than the minimal
copyright standard of 'distinguishable variation' must be added [in joint works] ....
Thus, under Picture Music something more than the minimal copyright standard of 'dis-
tinguishable variation' must be added by a later contributor in order to permit a finding
that the resulting product constitutes a joint work." Id. (footnote omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See Compendium II of Copyright Office Practice § 202.2(a) (1984) (defining de
minimus for purposes of original works of authorship). "De minimis. Works that lack
even a certain minimum amount of original authorship are not copyrightable. Such
works are often described as 'de minimis,' in reference to the principle embodied in the
Latin maxim 'de minimis non curat lex.'" Id.
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qualify as contributions when interwoven into a joint work.2 0 7 He
concludes that if it is significant, a mere idea can qualify as a contribu-
tion to a joint work. Nimmer's contention that ideas can qualify as a
contribution for authorship lacks basis in the statute; section 102(b) of
the 1976 Act unequivocally excludes ideas from the spectrum of copy-
rightable material.20 8
Once Nimmer's theory regarding ideas is discarded, his "de mini-
mus" theory collapses. The additional requirement of "significant
and substantial" is unnecessary when both coauthors' contributions
are copyrightable.
The most overlooked aspect undermining the precedential value of
the "de minimus" doctrine in joint authorship is that Picture Music
involved a derivative work, not a joint work. Even if a derivative au-
thor rewrites half of the existing work, this "substantial" contribution
does not qualify him as a joint author, because the contribution is not
contemporaneous with the creation of the original work.209
Additionally, the "de minimis" doctrine-requiring a judgment as
to the significance of the amount of contribution-flies in the face of
the originality standard of authorship as established by Justice
Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co. 210 Justice Holmes
found that the courts could not adequately weigh artistic contribu-
tions: "[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits." 21'
In line with Bleistein, the sole authorship standard of originality
presents a more equitable standard for joint authorship. Authors
have diverse talents, and cooperation among them is the essence of
joint authorship. Thus, weighing the artistic value of contributions
undermines joint works as well as sole works. The equivocation of
courts in applying the Picture Music "de minimis" standard empha-
sizes the preferability of the sole authorship standard. No clear dis-
tinguishing factors have been established to assist courts in applying
the "de minimus" standard, leading to a plethora of interpretations of
what is "substantial and significant."
This lack of a clear standard is apparent in the recent cases of Eck-
207. 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-18.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982).
209. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
210. 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
211. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
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ert v. Hurley Chicago Co. 2 12 and Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf &
Western Corp. ,213 which applied the Picture Music "de minimis" stan-
dard even though neither the 1976 Act nor the House Report ratified
this doctrine. Following the Picture Music precedent, Eckert required
an examination of the quality and quantity of the parties' contribu-
tions to determine intent.2 4 According to Eckert, the examination of
the work after its creation for the quality of an author's contribution
supports the requirement that coauthors supply copyrightable expres-
sions.2"5 Although Eckert is facially correct about the necessity of
copyrightability of all contributions in joint works, the "de minimis"
standard is irrelevant once copyrightability is established.21 6
c. Meltzer/Aitken: Originality Determined By Trade Practices
Meltzer v. Zoller 217 recognized a homeowner's claim that he
originated part of the architectural plans for his home.218 Because the
overall work was "substantially similar"2 9 to existing plans of the
architectural firm, however, the court held that this substantial simi-
larity rebutted the possibility of an original contribution by the home-
owner. 22 °  Another architectural case, Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman,
212. 638 F. Supp. 699, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("a line of cases on de minimus contribu-
tions has developed from ... the Three Little Pigs case").
213. 534 F. Supp. 606, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("additions 'too insubstantial' to induce
owner to share copyright") (construing Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F. Supp.
640, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997
(1972)). The Grosset additions were illustrations published in a book of illustrations and
stories. Id.
214. 638 F. Supp. at 704 (citing Kenbrooke Fabrics Inc. v. Material Things, 223
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). "[Q]uantity and quality of the parties' contribu-
tions [are] factors bearing on the ultimate question [ofi intent." Id. Plaintiff Eckert con-
tributed a photo to defendant Hurley's sales brochure. The court found that plaintiff's
contribution lacked quality and quantity to create joint work. Id.
215. See Eckert, 638 F. Supp. at 703 (citing Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847
(D.N.J. 1981). In Meltzer, the client contributed suggestions for the design of his home
to an architectural firm. The court indicated there was a question as to whether the client
also may have contributed sketches. Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 849 n.2. The court held
that the ideas and sketches of the client did not constitute fixed expressions of ideas, were
not copyrightable and, thus, no basis existed for coauthorship. Id. at 857.
216. See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text indicating Picture Music requires
more than copyrightability for joint authorship.
217. 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981) (homeowner's sketches and design details were
incorporated into architectural plans; court held homeowner was not joint author be-
cause the architectural firm fixed the plans and therefore client did not contribute copy-
rightable material).
218. Id. at 856 (citing Plaintiff's Trial Summary at 12-13).
219. Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 857 (D.N.J. 1981).
220. Id. at 856-57. "The [c]ourt now turns to plaintiff's contention that he is owner of
the plans as they are 'original in him.' Again, this [c]ourt finds that this contention is
without merit." Id. (citations omitted).
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Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co.,221 conditioned the originality and
copyrightability of a contribution on its fixation by the homeowner.2 22
Both Meltzer and Aitken incorrectly applied the copyrightability doc-
trine by predicating originality on trade practices which fail to recog-
nize client contributions in joint works. 2 23  The Meltzer/Aitken
originality formulation fails because if the homeowner's sketches rose
to the level of expressions,224 they would cross the threshold of mini-
mal deviation required for originality. 225 The Meltzer/Aitken origi-
nality standard, disallowing client contributions in joint authorship
due to trade practices, has directed other courts to misjudge
originality.226
A more direct approach to architectural plans would be to deter-
mine whether the architectural firm's contribution existed as an in-
dependent work prior to the contribution of the homeowner. Then,
even if both the architect and homeowner contributed modifications
or additions to the existing plans, the resulting work would be deriva-
tive, and the homeowner would have rights only in his contribution to
the derivative work. Although giving the architectural firm sole au-
thorship of the plans may appear to implement the constitutional
purpose of benefiting society227 by encouraging the creation of archi-
tectural plans, to totally ignore the contribution of the homeowner in
the name of trade practices creates an exception to copyright law be-
yond the 1976 Act. If the homeowner contributes an original expres-
sion contemporaneous with the creation of the plans, this effort
deserves full authorship protection under the Act. Additionally, con-
sideration of trade practices is a principle of contract law. Determin-
ing the vesting of a coauthor's rights through trade practices is
inconsistent with copyright law.
d. Originality: Implementing the Constitutional Purpose
The most equitable standard of originality in joint authorship is the
221. 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982) (holding no joint authorship in architectural
plans because trade practice did not recognize client as author, and therefore, architec-
tural firm had no intent to jointly own work).
222. Id. at 258-59.
223. Aitken, 542 F. Supp. at 259 (citations omitted). "[S]uch involvement by a client
in the preparation of architectural plans is normally expected. Such involvement does
not, however, ordinarily render the client an 'author' of the architectural plans." Id.
"[T]his type of consultation.., is typical in the architectural profession." See infra notes
230-46 and accompanying text regarding the Meltzer fixation equation.
224. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
225. Thus, the aspect to be determined here was not originality but expression.
226. See infra note 234.
227. See supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text.
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sole authorship standard. Contribution of an expression22 (one ulti-
mately assimilated into a joint work) should constitute sufficient
coauthorship effort. The constitutional purpose of the copyright
clause is to provide incentives for authors to create. By requiring
more of joint authors than sole authors, less incentive exists to create
joint works. In the creation of a joint work, diverse authors contrib-
ute diversely-if one author could create the work on his own, he
would. Weighing coauthors' contributions undermines the coopera-
tive nature of joint works by assuming those contributions were un-
necessary to the creation of the whole.
2. Fixation
Fixation is the setting of an expression in a tangible medium.229
The joint authorship pacesetter in fixation is Meltzer v. Zoller.23° In
Meltzer, "fixation" is equated with "creation" of a work 231 and deter-
mines ownership status.232 The Meltzer court conferred authorship of
architectural plans on the source of the fixation.233 The court con-
cluded that the homeowner who contributed "sketches" and "ideas"
was not a coauthor because he did not fix those contributions in ex-
pressions.231 The standard espoused by Meltzer fails to track the lan-
guage of the statute and misdirects subsequent case law. 235  For
228. See infra notes 247-65 and accompanying text, indicating that the contribution of
an idea is insufficient to confer authorship in a joint work.
229. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of 'fixed'). "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the
authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration."
Id.
230. 520 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1981).
231. Id. at 857.
232. Id.
233. Id. ("[tihe Chirgotis firm, by fixing the ideas for the Meltzer home in a tangible
medium, 'created' those plans, for pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 101, a 'work' is 'created' when
'it is fixed in a copy ... for the first time' ").
234. Id. at 849. "[Architect] proceeded to prepare some schematic sketches based
upon [second architect's] plans previously designed, but adjusted according to the
Meltzers' stated requirements." Id. "Plaintiff [homeowner] had prepared 'thumbnail'
sketches indicating his requirements [but] it is uncertain ... when [they] were shown to
[architect]." Id. at n.2. In Meltzer, the "previously designed" works, subsequently edited
to the homeowner's specifications, were derivative works. Nevertheless, the court dis-
cussed the elements of joint work and the Meltzer opinion was used as authority regard-
ing joint works in Eckert. Eckert, 638 F. Supp. 699, 703 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("[i]n Meltzer,
the court explained that [the architectural client contributing drawings and ideas is not a
coauthor] because the drawing is not 'created' until it is fixed in copy, and the ideas and
sketches contributed by the home buyer do not sufficiently constitute fixed expressions of
ideas").
235. CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2611
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example, following Meltzer, the court in Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman,
P.C. v. Empire Construction Co.,236 concluded that because the archi-
tect's firm fixed the "idea," the client was not an author.237
Meltzer construes the statutory definition of "created" as conferring
authorship on the fixer.2 3s The 1976 Act definition of creation states
that a work is "created" when it is fixed for the first time. The falla-
cious syllogism in Meltzer is:
Major premise - Fixation equals creation
Minor premise - "A" fixes work
Conclusion - "A" is creator of work.239
Although this conclusion supports Meltzer, it does not conform to
(1989) (construing Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 857, to hold that client contributions were
"insufficent to constitute 'fixed expressions of ideas,' hence [client] could not be consid-
ered an 'author' or 'joint author' of the plans"). CCNV used Meltzer to clarify the idea/
expression dichotomy and equated fixation with the elevation of an idea to the level of an
expression: "'Third World America,' however, was more than CCNV's abstract idea
[i.e., it was fixed]." Id. (emphasis added); Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp.
699, 703 (N.D. I11. 1986) (construing Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 857) ("[iun Meltzer, the
court explained that this is because the drawing is not 'created' until it is fixed in copy,
and the ideas and sketches contributed by the home buyer do not sufficiently constitute
fixed expressions of ideas (that is, copyrightable work) to make the buyer a 'co-crea-
tor' "); Aitken, Hazen, Hoffman, Miller, P.C. v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252,
259 (D. Neb. 1982) ("even as to this design idea, it was plaintiff's employees who, .
incorporat[ed] the idea into the ... architectural plans").
Other cases misconstrue fixation without directly citing Meltzer for support. See
S.O.S. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (construing CCNV, [citation omit-
ted]) ("to be an author, one must . . . 'translate an idea into a fixed, tangible expres-
sion.' "); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1734 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 1989);
Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318-19 (E.D. Pa. 1985), aff'd
on other grounds, 787 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[i]t is similar to an owner explaining to
an architect the type and functions of a building the architect is to design for the owner.
The architectural drawings are not coauthored by the owner, no matter how detailed the
ideas and limitations expressed by the owner").
236. 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982).
237. Id. at 259.
The only design idea which may be said to have originated in [the client] was
the design by which the balconies were to be attached to the exterior walls of
the apartment complex. However, even as to this design idea, it was the [archi-
tectural firm's] employees who prepared the actual design drawing incorporat-
ing the idea.
Id.; cf 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (indicating that an "idea" can never be the subject
matter of copyright).
238. See Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.N.J. 1981). "The [architectural]
firm, by fixing the ideas for the Meltzer home in a tangible medium, 'created' those plans.
It logically follows, then, that the [architectural] firm is the author of these plans for the
purpose of copyright interests." Id. (emphasis added). "Ideas" as used here is a misno-
mer. Ideas are not copyrightable regardless of the form in which they are embodied-
only expressions qualify a work for consideration as copyrightable. For further discus-
sion of the term "idea" as a misnomer, see infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
239. Id.
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the statute. The definition of "created" does not confer authorship on
the fixer; it merely sets the time at which "creation" occurs,2 i.e., the
time at which copyright protection commences. The statutory defini-
tion of "fixed" requires fixation by or under the authority of the au-
thor; therefore, authorship exists prior to fixation. Thus, one cannot
be the "creator" of a work merely by fixing it. A correct syllogism,
consistent with section 101,241 would be:
Major premise - Fixation authorized by author equals commence-
ment of copyright protection
Minor premise - Work is fixed by "A" under authority of author
Conclusion - Copyright protection of work commences.242
An important aspect of this corrected syllogism is the emphasis on the
work rather than on the one who fixes it.
Meltzer protracts the arc of its illogical reasoning to encompass the
faulty conclusion that, because the homeowner's "ideas and sketches"
were not fixed by him, they were abstract ideas not rising to the level
of copyrightability.243 The statute, however, does not require fixation
in order to make abstract ideas concrete; fixation is required to set
expression in a tangible medium. 2 " Abstract ideas, in any form, do
not qualify for copyright protection.245
Conferring joint authorship rights on the source of fixation has ob-
vious policy-based origins. By narrowing rights in the work, this pol-
240. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of created) ("[a] work is 'created' when it is
fixed in a copy or phonorecord for the first time") (emphasis added). The statute uses
"creation" to set the time when copyright protection attaches to the work. A work can
be created, i.e., have an existence, before fixation occurs, as in a live performance that has
not yet been fixed. The term "creation" is also used in 17 U.S.C. § 302 for purposes of
calculating duration of the copyright protection. Id. § 302.
241. "A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period
of more than transitory duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of "fixed") (empha-
sis added). Thus, the statute contemplates that authorship precedes fixation, and there-
fore, fixation does not of itself confer authorship status on the fixer.
242. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). The definition of "created" in § 101 sets the time of
creation at fixation; it does not designate the fixer as creator.
243. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (1981). "The ideas and sketches contrib-
uted by [homeowner] do not sufficiently constitute fixed expressions of ideas; therefore
[homeowner] is not the 'creator' of the plans.., for copyright purposes. Without author-
ship, the sine non que [sic] of copyright, [homeowner] has no cause of action." Id. This
conclusion is sine ratio, but not without disciples-most notably CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d
1485, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
244. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with
this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression
.... I Id.
245. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982); see infra note 255 and accompanying text.
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icy protects architectural firms who provide most of the labor on
architectural plans. Another way to narrow rights in architectural
plans246 would be through the doctrine of derivative works: if the
homeowner's contribution is an addition to a preexisting work by the
architectural firm, the homeowner receives rights only in his own con-
tribution, and is not owner of a full undivided interest in the whole.
3. Idea/Expression Dichotomy
The acceptability of ideas as contributions in joint authorship ap-
parently derives authority from Nimmer.247 In CCNV,24 8 the D.C.
Circuit equivocated on deciding whether ideas were contributions in
joint works. The court qualified its guarded stance with the language
"if Nimmer is correct, ' 249 and with the characterization of preceding
case law addressing the idea/expression dichotomy in joint author-
ship as "sparse."250 CCNV regarded this sparcity of case law as a
result of the 1909 Act, which grouped commissioned works under the
"broad scope" 251 of the work for hire doctrine.
Under the 1976 Act, however, the scope of the work for hire doc-
trine is much narrower.252 In drawing this distinction, the D.C. Cir-
cuit acknowledged the disparity between the work for hire exception,
which does not require compliance with the copyrightability doc-
trine,253 and joint authorship, which requires authorship and, there-
fore, copyrightability.254 CCNV recognized that section 102(b) limits
copyright protection in joint authorship to expressions, and quoted
the statute: " '[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to an idea ... regardless of the form in
which it is ... embodied in such work.' "255 Despite recognizing this
basic precept of the copyrightability doctrine, CCNV, by acknowledg-
246. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
247. 1 NIMMER, supra note 16, § 6.07, at 6-18 (indicating plot ideas may suffice as
contribution in joint authorship).
248. 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
249. Id. at 1496 n.15.
250. Id. at 1497 n.17.
251. Id.
252. See id.
253. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1982) (employer and qualified commissioning party in work
for hire "considered the author" for purposes of the statute despite lack of creative
input).
254. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (definition of joint work indicating preparation by two or
more "authors").
255. CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1497 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) and construing Meltzer, 520
F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.N.J. 1981)). As discussed earlier in this Note, Meltzer's rationale
on fixation does not truly track the statute. See supra notes 229-46 and accompanying
text.
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ing that the commissioning party's choice of title and legend may bol-
ster its stance as a joint author,25 6 appears to adopt Nimmer's theory
that ideas can qualify as contributions in joint authorship.257
CCNV approaches the idea/expression dichotomy with the erro-
neous assumption that fixing an idea makes it an expression and,
therefore, copyrightable.I 8 The idea/expression dichotomy is not
contingent on a fixing of the work; making an abstract idea concrete
does not convert it into an expression. 259 The statute is plain on this
point: "no idea [is copyrightable] regardless of the form in which it is
... embodied in such work. ' 260 The fixation requirement is separate
and distinct from the idea/expression dichotomy.261
In CCNV, the supervision of the commissioning party over the in-
dependent contractor 262 would not be sufficient to endow coauthor-
256. CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1496 n.15.
If Nimmer is correct on the point that the contribution of a joint author need
not be copyrightable 'standing alone,' even CCNV's choice of the title ... and
the legend for the pedestal ... while not indepdently [sic] copyrightable... may
count, along with other CCNV contributions, toward meeting the 'more than
de minimis threshold required for joint authorship."
Id. (citations omitted). In his explanation accompanying S. 1253, Senator Thad Cochran
takes specific exception to this footnote as proposing the unconstitutional conferring of
authorship on one who is not in fact an author. See S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., § II,
at 1 (1989) (Amended Definition of "Joint Work"; "Original" Contribution); see also 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1989) (defining "created").
257. See 1989 Hearings, supra note 128 at 19 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of
Copyrights).
The CCNV court indicated that perhaps 'the contribution of a joint author need
not be copyrightable 'standing alone,' and thus, the supplying of an un-
copyrightable title or legend could count toward meeting the 'more than de
minimus threshold required for joint authorship.' While there is some uncer-
tainly about the full thrust of this dictum, I conclude that this uncertainty will
likely lead to years of litigation, and, if interpreted to mean that a joint author
need not contribute any copyrightable expression, will violate the statute, and
arguably the Constitution.
Id. (citations omitted).
258. See supra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
259. But see CCNV, 846 F.2d at 1497. "'Third World America'. . . was more than
CCNV's abstract idea." Id. CCNV appears to indicate that making an abstract idea
concrete confers authorship and cites Meltzer as support for this proposition. Id. (citing
Meltzer, 520 F. Supp. at 857). For critical comments rebutting the Meltzer theory equat-
ing fixation with authorship status, see supra notes 229-46 and accompanying text.
260. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
261. The idea/expression dichotomy is explained in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1879) and Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976). In these cases, the determining factor was whether the contri-
bution constituted a system rather than an expression, or whether it was sufficiently
detailed to constitute an expression. The issue was not whether an abstract idea was
given concrete form.
262. 846 F.2d at 1497. "CCNV ... monitored the progress of the work." Id. at 1496
n. 15 (CCNV chose the title and legend for the pedestal).
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ship status; supervision does not rise to the level of expression."'
CCNV, however, did contribute an expression (the pedestal) to the
work.
The policy considerations supporting ideas as contributions in a
joint work are doctrinally unsound under the constitutional copyright
provision. There is no incentive for an author to create a work which
will vest coownership in another who has merely contributed ideas to
the work. The concept of vesting ownership in one who has merely
contributed supervision and control derives its force as a carry-over
from the work for hire doctrine.264 The Supreme Court in CCNV re-
jected right to control and actual control of the work as vesting au-
thorship in work for hire situations,265 thereby rejecting "sweat of the
brow" policy considerations in favor of an interpretation closer to the
statutory purpose of the drafters and Congress. In light of the
Supreme Court decision in CCNV, supervision and control must be
rejected from consideration as contributions to a joint work-the stat-
utory definition of joint work requires both contributors to be authors.
To qualify as an author, one must contribute expressions, not ideas,
whether the work is to be solely or jointly owned. CCNV recognized
that once work for hire has been discounted, there is still a possibility
that joint authorship may exist. But in that case, CCNV contributed
the pedestal, a contribution beyond mere ideas. Thus, joint author-
ship did exist in CCNV because both parties contributed copyright-
able expressions which merged into a unitary whole.
The requirement that contributions to a joint work be copyright-
able comports with the application of the copyrightability doctrine to
solely authored works. The constitutional protections provide power-
ful incentives, which must not be diluted through extension to non-
creators unless, as in work for hire, such non-creators are specifically
provided for by Congress.
B. Intent
Attempting to create a bright line separating joint works from com-
263. Supervision is a throwback to work for hire and has no place in joint authorship.
Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi is endeavoring to make inroads on this misconcep-
tion. Senator Cochran has proposed legislation amending the joint authorship definition.
S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). In his comments supporting this bill, the Senator
indicates that " '[t]he constitutional imperative [protecting authors] may not be circum-
vented by describing one as a 'joint' author. One must still be an 'author.' " S. 1253,
101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S7343-44 (daily ed. June 22, 1989).
264. See CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989),
which sets forth the requirements for work for hire.
265. Id. at 4612; see supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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pilations and derivative works, Congress inadvertently drew a line de-
nying some authors their constitutional rights in property by
introducing intent as the most essential element in the definition of
joint work. The subjective standard applied to intent in the definition
of joint work fails to implement the protective purpose of Congress in
enacting the 1976 Act. Therefore, a new standard must be adopted to
fulfill the legislative goals of the statute.
The intent element of the joint work definition requires that authors
know others will be contributing to the work, and make their contri-
bution with this knowledge. 266 This is the common design standard
qualified with a knowledge standard rather than a subjective standard.
This is manifest intent.
In CCNV, the sculptor Reid knew the work would include a pedes-
tal, but later claimed he did not have the state of mind to be a joint
author. Rather than his subjective intent, this knowledge and his sub-
sequent contribution with this knowledge were the factors which de-
termined his authorship status.267
In Easter Seal, the television station and the Easter Seal Society
knew they were working together on the videotapes of the parade.
Even with this knowledge, they claimed to lack the intent to jointly
author the work, but the court refused to permit this self-serving sub-
jective intent to determine their authorship status.268
The knowledge element merely requires the coauthor's awareness
that others are contributing; it does not require, however, the author's
awareness of the legal ramifications of their involvement. This was
the standard espoused by the Strauss court, which regarded Strauss's
knowledge that the captions would be superimposed on his photo-
graph as meeting the intent element of the statute.269
The word "intent" in the definition of joint work was designed to
preclude "12th Street Rag" 270 scenarios where the author of a work
having an independent pre-existence is unaware of future coauthors.
Through the use of a knowledge standard, a "12th Street Rag" situa-
tion could never occur, because in that case the composer was not
266. This knowledge corresponds to the awareness of collaborating authors that their
contributions will be merged.
267. CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
268. Easter Seal Soc'y v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 981 (1988).
269. Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 1988 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 26,244, at 21,722
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 1988). "It is apparent from Strauss's deposition that he knew cap-
tions and other copy would be superimposed upon the photograph when the article was
put in its final form." Id.
270. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
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aware his work would subsequently be merged with other works.
Congress, therefore, used "intent" to grant authors working at differ-
ent times rights equal to collaborating authors.
C. Merger
The merger phrase of the statute requires the fusion of two parts
into "inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 27 '
Merger results from the common purpose in creating the work as a
unity.272
In determining whether contributions have merged, two factors dis-
tinguish joint works from collective works and derivative works.
First, the contribution must have existed only as part of the joint
work-it must not have had an independent preexistence. Secondly,
the parts must be interdependent or inseparable.
1. Independent Preexistence
The first factor in determining whether merger occurs in a joint
work is whether the contributions constitute "parts" of a unitary
whole. Contributions cannot be considered parts of a joint work if
they had a previous independent existence. For example, a novel can
never merge as "part" of a motion picture for joint authorship pur-
poses because the work had a previous independent existence.273 In
close collaboration situations, the preexistence of either part is easily
discounted because both parts are generated simultaneously. In situa-
tions like Marks, however, where one part is generated first and a
second added later, independent preexistence is possible. In these
cases, the work in its current form and its history provide the only
means of determining whether the work existed in another form. The
subjective intent of the author does not determine merger in these
cases. Even if the author had the state of mind that he coauthor the
motion picture first, if his creation existed as a novel first, the novel's
use in the motion picture is derivative.
271. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining joint works).
272. STUDY No. 31, supra note 44, at 174 (construing Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir.
1944): "Judge Hand noted that, although the parts were separable and capable of being
used separately, this was not their purpose. He distinguished a work of joint authorship
from what he called a 'composite work'-a work in which each part is separate and the
only unity is the fact that the parts are bound together").
273. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120. This can be traced back to the origins of joint
authorship, which required collaboration, and only later warranted that two authors




The preexistence of a part or all of a work is a problematic facet of
joint authorship. In "Melancholy Baby," the first version of the song
preexisted the final version which the court determined to be a joint
work.274 In "12th Street Rag," the contribution of the first author, a
piano solo having a previous independent existence, also qualified as
part of a joint work. 275 Both these cases were rejected by the 1976
Act 2 76 because the preexistence of a contribution as an independent
work disqualifies it for joint authorship purposes. The Second Circuit
in Weissman upheld this proposition by rejecting the theory that the
previous contribution of an author to a work qualified him as a joint
author in a derivative work.27 7
Not all cases are as clear cut as "Melancholy Baby" or "12th Street
Rag." Many cases involve an author who begins work on a project,
drops out in the middle, and whose discarded efforts do not become
part of the final product; or, similar to "12th Street Rag," an author
creates the musical composition before the lyrics are added.
The merger element in these cases is dependent on the the existence
of a common design during creation of the work. The manifest in-
tent-the objective creation of the work itself-evidences the merger
of the parts. Because the copyrightability doctrine requires only crea-
tion of the work and no registration,2 7s there are no other objective
criteria by which to judge whether a contribution becomes part of the
work.
2. Second Merger Factor: Inseparable and Interdependent
At the heart of joint authorship is the interdependence or insepara-
bility of the contributions in the work. The House Report indicates
that this merger separates joint works from collective works.279 One
274. 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 820 (1947).
275. 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modified on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
276. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
277. Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989).
278. Some cases have held that copyright registration by one author evidences a sub-
jective intent contradicting joint authorship. In Grosset & Dunlap, Inc. v. Gulf & West-
ern Corp., 534 F.Supp 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court reasoned that registration of the
copyright determines the preexisting status of a contribution. In Rodak v. Esprit Racing
Team, 1986 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 25,883, at 20,020 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 1985),
registration of copyright evidenced an independent pre-existence of the work before the
addition of the illustrations to the ads. The registration of a copyright by one coauthor
can be considered held in trust for the other author. See Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195, 201
(S.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921). This, plus the fact that it merely
represents the subjective intent of one author, negates the validity of registration as deter-
mining preexistence of part of a work.
279. H.R. REP., supra note 3, at 120. "The definition of 'joint work' is to be contrasted
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study, crucial in formulating the definition in the statute, used a story
as an example of a joint work, and a magazine as an example of a
collective work.2"' Articles in a magazine do not merge with one an-
other, but the contributions of two authors collaborating on one story
in that magazine do merge.
Merger occurs when the work is complete and capable of achieving
its ultimate purpose. This principle was articulated in Marks, as con-
strued by the Second Circuit in Weissman: "their individual author-
ship efforts would have to be combined in order to create the final
integrated product-a commercially viable song."2 '
V. Conclusion
In 1872, only a year after the seminal joint authorship case of Levy
v. Rutley, Lewis Carroll revealed a reversed realm where colloquial-
isms take on a literal interpretation, often with absurd results. Many
colloquialisms of the 19th century genre spawning both Through The
Looking Glass and Levy v. Rutley have lost meaning in the modem
era. Similarly, "common design," clearly defined at the advent of the
century, now is dim and confusing.
The 1976 Act, attempting to clarify the standard of joint author-
ship, only plunged it deeper into the pitfalls of a modern legal lexicon.
Once common design was transformed into "intent," its infusion with
an equivocal state of mind standard was inevitable.
By disregarding established copyright doctrine, the subjective
intent standard leads not only to absurd results but also to the depri-
vation of authors' rights. The primary considerations in joint author-
ship should be whether the contribution is copyrightable in and of
with the definition of 'collective work,'. . . in which the elements of merger and unity are
lacking; there the key elements are assemblage or gathering of 'separate and independent
works ... into a collective whole." Id.
280. STUDY No. 12, supra note 28, at 87.
In broad terms a 'joint work' is a unitary work, the parts of which, although
created by several authors, are not considered to be individual works in them-
selves. A simple example would be a story written by two authors; here the
contribution of either one is not separately identifiable or, though identifiable, is
not capable of use as a separate work in itself. A 'composite work,' broadly
speaking, is one which puts together the separate and distinct works of different
authors. A clear-cut example would be a magazine containing a number of
short stories contributed by vaious independent authors; here each story is sepa-
rately identified and capable of separate use as a work itself.
Id.
281. 684 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313,
1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989) (construing Edward B. Marks Music
Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F. 2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944)).
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itself, whether it pre-existed as an independent work, and whether it is
"inseparable" or "interdependent" with the contribution of others.
A new standard must be enunciated which allows the courts to ap-
ply established precepts of copyrightability to the components of a
joint work and still comply with the 1976 Act. Since the statute and
the House Report clearly indicate intent is to be the touchstone of
joint authorship, this "intent" element should be read as manifest in-
tent, exhibited by the creation of the work as a unitary whole. Once
an author is aware his work will be part of a greater whole and his
contribution is "inextricably woven ... [into] the seamless fabric of
the work," '2 82 no trap door should allow him to escape the conse-
quences of joining his contribution with that of another.
Therese M. Brady
282. 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944).
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